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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
1
(ACA) will take full effect. With its intimidating length and
complex provisions, the ACA means many things to many people. On the one hand, it is a health-insurance statute, designed
to extend coverage to the un- and under-insured. On the other,
it is public health legislation, geared toward improving the
overall health and wellness of Americans. It contains provisions
dealing with prescription drug regulation, funding for health
2
education, and fraud and abuse. However, this Article argues
that the ACA functions as yet another kind of law: civil rights
law. Specifically, the statute may be understood as a disability
rights law. Although not yet widely recognized as such, the
ACA constitutes one of the most significant civil rights victories
for the disability community in recent history.
Legislation bearing on disability has traditionally been divided into two distinct substantive areas of protection: (1) legislation regulating health-care access and promoting public
health and welfare (“health law”) and (2) legislation furthering
equality, access, and integration (“civil rights law”). “Health
law” encompasses statutes and regulations that provide public
health insurance and benefits, govern the private healthinsurance industry, and promote public health. Examples include Medicare and Medicaid, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, and statutes requiring federally funded
entities to collect and report health-related data. Alternatively,
“civil rights law” is designed to promote equality, access, and
integration. Disability rights statutes serve these goals by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. The primary
disability antidiscrimination statutes are the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

1. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, 1 HEALTH CARE REFORM SPECIAL
ALERT § 1.01 (2010) (providing an overview of history and provisions of the
ACA).
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Until the disability rights movement of the last forty years,
disability legislation consisted almost exclusively of social welfare protections, some of which fall under the broad umbrella of
health law. However, when disability rights advocates mobilized in the 1970s, they reframed the disadvantages faced by
people with disabilities from personal, medical problems to the
consequences of pervasive, society-wide stigma and discrimination. In promoting independence for individuals with disabilities, advocates renounced the charity-driven paternalism of the
existing social-benefits system, resulting in a move toward antidiscrimination protections as the preferred means for accomplishing their goals.
Yet despite the groundswell of support within the disability
rights movement, civil rights laws have failed to address the
serious health disparities that the disability community faces.
People with disabilities encounter numerous barriers to accessing health care. For instance, Medicaid and Medicare often fail
to cover needed health services and medical equipment. Moreover, for individuals with disabilities who do not qualify for public programs, the risk assessment and cost-sharing practices of
the private health-insurance industry frequently render them
un- or under-insured. Finally, public health authorities have
historically failed to compile information related to disability,
making the extent of these disparities difficult to assess. Although both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA facially apply
in health-care settings, those statutes have been ineffective at
targeting these inequities because of their civil rights structure.
The statutes’ vulnerability to restrictive court interpretations,
coupled with their focus on individual instances of discrimination, make civil rights law an inappropriate tool for challenging
health disparities.
Quite intuitively, the solution to the inequities experienced
by individuals with disabilities in health care appears to rest—
not in civil rights law—but in health law. Both scholars and activists alike have proposed that the future of disability rights
lies in protections traditionally associated with health legislation. The ACA makes that proposal a reality. The statute includes multiple provisions that both explicitly and implicitly
benefit people with disabilities, including its attempted expansion of Medicaid and public health-insurance coverage for ongoing care, its elimination of preexisting condition exclusions
and limitations on health status-based rating, and its recognition of people with disabilities as a health disparities group.
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By promoting the interests of people with disabilities, the
ACA demonstrates that a health law can function as a civil
rights law. That is to say, legislation written with health law
objectives and content may have a civil rights impact, such as
furthering equality, access, and integration. More broadly, the
ACA exemplifies how advocates can harness law outside the
traditional civil rights paradigm to achieve their goals.
This Article, therefore, asserts that laws may have meaningful effects outside their substantive paradigms. In so doing,
it makes a novel distinction between a law’s articulated purpose and that law’s practical impact. It is an article about the
effectiveness of statutes, not their superficial substantive classification. Moreover, this Article provides the first broad, indepth reading of recent health-care reform in terms of disability rights. Specifically, it argues that, although not explicitly
framed as disability rights legislation, the ACA still functions
as such. Thus, this Article establishes that non-civil rights
statutes can affect civil rights outcomes, a useful insight in this
context and beyond.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I limns the historical division between the health and civil rights paradigms
within disability law and proposes the potential reasons for
that divide. Part II explores the disparities in health-care access experienced by people with disabilities and the failure of
traditional civil rights legislation to address these inequities
adequately. Finally, Part III reads the ACA as a piece of disability rights legislation, examining the role of disability rights
organizations in its passage and the statute’s impact on individuals with disabilities. The ACA therefore demonstrates that
health legislation may act as a vehicle for civil rights. The Article concludes that to achieve holistic equality for people with
disabilities, disability rights advocates must move beyond the
civil rights paradigm by integrating other kinds of legal protections into their agendas for change. This valuable lesson applies both beyond the realm of health law and beyond the needs
of the disability community.
I. “HEALTH” AND “CIVIL RIGHTS”: COMPETING
PARADIGMS
This Article proposes that portions of the ACA function as
disability rights law. Disability legislation has traditionally
fallen into two separate, substantive categories: one intended to
provide health care and resources to people with disabilities
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and one intended to promote their equality, access, and integration. Thus, insofar as the ACA represents a health law that
furthers the rights of people with disabilities, it constitutes a
departure from this conventional division. Part I explores the
concept of disability as it pertains to both health and civil
rights laws, traces the historical schism between those frameworks, and provides some explanations for that divide.
A. TRADITIONAL SCHISM
Disability is conceptually complex, incorporating social, le3
gal, and medical aspects. Not surprisingly, the law has struggled regarding what qualifies as a disability and how to protect
4
individuals within this large and diverse category. Given the
increased need for health care faced by many individuals with
disabilities, the law has at times framed “disability” as a medical designation. However, people with disabilities also face significant social barriers, which stem not from medical need but
from stigma and stereotype. Consequently, the law has also defined “disability” in terms of the social experiences of exclusion,
disadvantage, and discrimination. The result has been a substantive split between the health and civil rights protections for
5
individuals with disabilities.
3. Defining “disability” has been an on-going source of debate. At various
points in time, disability has held differing connotations: social, medical, and
even moral. See generally Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352 (2000)
(examining the historically complex task of defining a person with a disability,
as well as the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of disability under the
ADA); Simi Linton, Reassigning Meaning, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER
223, 223–36 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010).
4. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003);
see also Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579 (2004).
5. I am not the first disability legal scholar to identify this distinction.
Most famously, Samuel Bagenstos differentiated between types of legal protections for people with disabilities in his groundbreaking article, The Future of
Disability Law, describing them as the “antidiscrimination” and “social welfare” paradigms. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114
YALE L.J. 1 (2004). Similarly, Ani Satz has explored the limits of antidiscrimination law and the “targeted legal approach” in her scholarship on fragmentation. See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513 (2008) [hereinafter Satz, Disability,
Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination]; Ani B. Satz, Fragmented
Lives: Disability Discrimination and the Role of “Environment-Framing,” 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (2011) [hereinafter Satz, Fragmented Lives]; Ani B.
Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J.
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1. Health Law and Disability
6

Health law encompasses several kinds of legal protections.
For the purposes of this Article, “health law” connotes laws that
govern access to health services and health insurance coverage,
as well as those intended to restore or promote health and
7
wellness. It, therefore, focuses on three kinds of substantive
health law protections: (1) public health insurance and government benefits; (2) laws governing private health insurance;
and (3) public health initiatives and regulation. All three kinds
of health law protections relate to people with disabilities.
a. Public Benefits and Disability
Before the advent of the disability rights movement of the
1970s and 1980s, “disability law” consisted almost exclusively
8
of social welfare statutes. In the United States, people with
disabilities tend to seek health insurance in the public sector—
frequently from Medicare and Medicaid—due to the various
risk-assessment and cost-reducing mechanisms common in the
9
private insurance industry.
277 (2010) [hereinafter Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation].
Notably, Bagenstos and Satz focus primarily on social welfare as a legal
category. Alternatively, while the health law model I describe includes social
welfare protections, it also incorporates private insurance and public health
law, making it a broader designation.
6. Practicing health law may concurrently incorporate aspects of administrative law, contracts, corporate law, torts, and even criminal law. Jennifer
A. Stiller, What is Health Law?, in HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1:1 (2011).
Thus, health law practitioners must integrate multiple fields of legal expertise, including professional licensure and regulation, tax, fraud and abuse, antitrust, medical malpractice (and other torts), insurance law, and various other specialties—pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and intellectual property to
name a few—depending on the scope of their practice. Id.
7. Samuel Bagenstos defines his “social welfare approach” as “sustained
and direct government intervention through such means as public funding and
provision of services.” See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 55. Thus, the “health
law paradigm” as used in this Article describes the substance and purpose of
the legislation, i.e., its goal of promoting and sustaining health, whereas
Bagenstos’s “social welfare approach” describes how the programs created by
that legislation are provided, i.e., through government intervention. Thus,
while public health initiatives are part of the “health law paradigm,” insofar
as they don’t confer some kind of a tangible benefit, they may not fall within
the “social welfare approach.”
8. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 10 (describing pre-1970s “disability law”
as “effectively nothing more than a subcategory of social welfare law”). Many
of these benefits provision policies date back as far as the Civil War era. Id.
9. Id. at 32 (explaining that “limitations on private insurance coverage
have driven people with disabilities into the public health care system, primarily Medicare and Medicaid”). These mechanisms include preexisting condi-
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People with disabilities may qualify for public health insurance. Often, that eligibility is linked to government wage
benefits. Individuals with disabilities can apply for two different programs pursuant to the Social Security Act: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) under Title II and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI. SSDI pays
benefits to recipients based on their previous wage contribu10
tions. Thus, only individuals with disabilities who have
11
worked may apply. After two years of SSDI enrollment, beneficiaries become eligible for federally provided health insurance
12
under Medicare. Alternatively, SSI is a means-tested program: eligibility is based only on the applicant’s current in13
come. SSI, therefore, provides wage support—regardless of
14
work history—to certain enumerated groups. SSI recipients
15
are eligible for public health insurance under Medicaid. Individuals with disabilities may receive benefits simultaneously
from both programs; however a recipient’s SSDI benefits are
16
included when calculating her SSI eligibility. Thus, four social
welfare programs apply to individuals with disabilities—two
providing cash benefits and two providing public health17
insurance coverage.

tion exclusions and lifetime and annual caps. For a discussion of the negative
impact of traditional private, for-profit health insurance practices on individuals with disabilities, see discussion, infra notes 21–35 and accompanying text
and infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
10. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2012 RED BOOK: A SUMMARY GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT SUPPORTS FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAMS,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/redbook/eng/main.htm [hereinafter SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., RED BOOK]. Thus, Samuel Bagenstos characterizes SSDI as “early retirement pay.” Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11.
11. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11 (explaining that SSDI applies to workers who have contributed to the Social Security trust fund).
12. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY BENEFITS 14 (June 2012).
13. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RED BOOK, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that “[t]he
SSI program makes cash assistance payments to aged, blind, and disabled
persons (including children) who have limited income and resources”).
14. See id.
15. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 10 (2012)
(directing SSI recipients to their local welfare or medical assistance office for
information about Medicaid).
16. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., RED BOOK, supra note 10, at 7 (describing receiving
both SSDI and SSI benefits as “concurrent benefits”).
17. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing disability benefits programs).
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b. Private Health Insurance and Disability
Laws governing private health insurers also constitute
part of the health law universe. Yet in this context, one can
perhaps learn more about the effect of health law on people
with disabilities from where regulation is absent, rather than
where it is present. Private health insurers have historically
engaged in a variety of practices that, although not explicitly
dealing with disability, have systematically disadvantaged the
18
chronically ill and disabled. With some notable exceptions,
such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), health insurance law is by and large an area of regulation left to the states. It typically deals with setting standards for insurers (including access to coverage, required benefits, and premium rates), regulating market conduct, and
19
fielding complaints. Yet, until recently, the law of health insurance did not intervene to mitigate many of the industry
20
practices that disadvantage people with disabilities.
In the private sector, health insurers obtain their profits by
21
accurately assessing the risks of their insureds. One historically common mechanism for differentiating between good and
bad health risks impacts many individuals with disabilities:
the preexisting condition exclusion. Health insurers have used
preexisting conditions to deny or to limit coverage. Prior to
health-care reform, insurers cited preexisting conditions to jus22
tify denying coverage to one in seven applicants. In addition
18. See Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1159, 1166 (“In private, for-profit health-insurance, both individual and
group health insurers have historically engaged in risk-assessment and other
profit-maximizing strategies that systematically disadvantage people with histories of illness and chronic health conditions.”); see also Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73
(2005) [hereinafter Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy]; Elizabeth
Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 453 (2009) [hereinafter Pendo, Working
Sick].
19. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE WORKS: A
PRIMER 2008 UPDATE 813 (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/
insurance/upload/7766.pdf.
20. The ACA addresses many of the provisions that adversely affect people with disabilities. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
21. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1162.
22. Memorandum from Henry A. Waxman & Bart Stupak to Members of
the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing Conditions in the Individual Health Insurance Market (Oct. 12, 2010) (finding that
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23

to denying an individual outright, a private health insurer
may offer the applicant a policy that excludes coverage for a
particular condition if that condition pre-dates the individual’s
24
application for health insurance. Preexisting conditions may
include any number of conditions, ranging from life-threatening
25
to purely cosmetic. Consequently, impairments that rise to
the level of disability almost always represent the kind of
preexisting condition that would impede one’s access to health
insurance.
Pricing premiums based on health status may also disparately affect people with disabilities who apply for private health
insurance. When setting rates and premiums, health insurers
traditionally evaluate their potential insureds’ health histo26
ries. Individuals who have required more health services in
the past are thus more likely to require health services in the
future, thereby increasing the likelihood that the insurance
company will at some point pay out for a claim. As a result,

“[f]rom 2007 through 2009, the four largest for-profit health insurance companies, Aetna, Humana, UnitedHealth Group, and WellPoint, refused to issue
health insurance coverage to more than 651,000 people based on their prior
medical history” and that “[o]n average, the four companies denied coverage to
one out of every seven applicants based on a pre-existing condition”).
23. Id.
24. DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE 226 (David
Edward Marcinko ed., 2006) (defining “preexisting condition” as “[i]n health
insurance, an injury, sickness, or physical condition that existed before the
policy effective date. Most individual policies will not cover a preexisting condition; most group policies will.”); see also Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for
the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 304 (1993)
(“Pre-existing condition clauses exclude payment for any condition the applicant had prior to the insurance contract.”). Importantly, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) placed some limits on group insurers’ ability to impose preexisting condition exclusions. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1181(a)(1) (2006) (stating that insurers may only impose a preexisting condition exclusion when “(1) such exclusion relates to a condition (whether physical or mental), regardless of the cause of the condition, for which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or received within the 6month period ending on the enrollment date; (2) such exclusion extends for a
period of not more than 12 months (or 18 months in the case of a late enrollee)
after the enrollment date; and (3) the period of any such preexisting condition
exclusion is reduced by the aggregate of the periods of creditable coverage”).
25. Anything from AIDS to acne may be considered a preexisting condition. See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW ACCESSIBLE IS
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN LESS-THAN-PERFECT
HEALTH? 1 (2001), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/20010620a-index
.cfm.
26. Roberts, supra note 18, at 1165.
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health insurers charge more to insure “high-risk” applicants.
People with disabilities—who as a group use health services
more frequently—therefore often pay higher rates for private
28
health insurance.
Although preexisting condition exclusions and healthstatus based rating have been characteristic of the individual
insurance market, people with disabilities may likewise experience disadvantages in group health insurance. Group health
insurers also engage in several cost-sharing practices—such as
deductibles, co-insurance, and co-payments—that result in
insureds with higher health-care costs paying more out-of29
pocket. Finally, both annual and lifetime caps on coverage
force individuals in need of on-going care to cover significant
30
portions of their treatment costs. All of these practices have a
disproportionate impact on people with disabilities, who as a
group tend to consume more health services.
Ironically, having an increased need for health services often makes attaining those services more challenging for people
with disabilities, either because private health insurers are less
likely to cover them or because the available policies contain
31
cost- or coverage-limiting provisions. Even prior to the ACA,
27. Stone, supra note 24, at 306 (explaining that health insurers may increase premiums and limit coverage for high-risk individuals).
28. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH CARE
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 46 (2009) (stating that “purchasers [with disabilities] are often charged premiums that are higher than those charged to individuals without disabilities”).
29. Id.; see also Pendo, Working Sick, supra note 18, at 466–67.
30. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 27–28 (describing the effect of preexisting
condition exclusions and annual and lifetime caps on people with disabilities).
31. See Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health
Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 83 (2000) [hereinafter
Crossley, Becoming Visible] (“[I]n many cases . . . high-risk enrollees whom
insurers try to avoid are individuals who have a chronic medical condition or
some other disabling condition. A situation results in which the profit motive
drives insurers in many cases to actively avoid persons with disabilities as
customers . . . .”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 27–29 (explaining the
effect of preexisting condition exclusions and annual and lifetime caps on private insurance coverage for people with disabilities). This irony is central to
many of Deborah Stone’s critiques of the American health-insurance system.
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 24, at 308 (“The logic and methods of actuarial
fairness mean denying insurance to those who most need medical care. The
principle actually distributes medical care in inverse relation to need, and to
the large extent that commercial insurers operate on this principle, the American reliance on the private sector as its main provider of health insurance establishes a system that is perfectly and perversely designed to keep sick people away from doctors.”); see also Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health
Insurance Reform in One Easy Lesson, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652 (2008).
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both state and the federal legislators attempted to limit some of
these exclusionary practices by restricting pre-existing condi32
33
tion exclusions or through guaranteed issue laws. Yet despite these efforts, many individuals with disabilities continued
to be ineligible for private insurance and those that did qualify
34
paid substantial premiums for their policies. Thus, individuals with disabilities not covered by Medicare or Medicaid fre35
quently found themselves uninsured.
c. Public Health and Disability
Finally, laws designed to promote public health also deal
with issues related to disability. Public health is “what we as a
society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people
36
can be healthy.” In the United States, public health has re32. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, HEALTH INSURMARKET REFORMS: PRE-EXISTING CONDITION EXCLUSIONS (Sept. 2012)
(describing the pre-ACA regulation of pre-existing condition exclusions by
state and federal laws and the impact of health-care reform on that regulation).
33. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS: GUARANTEED ISSUE (June 2012) (“In most states, insurers are not required to guarantee issue policies to individuals. However,
under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996, some insurance companies are required to guarantee issue
policies to certain individuals, referred to as HIPAA-eligible individuals, regardless of their health status and disability.”). As of June 2012, only six
states guaranteed issue of all products to all of their residents. Id.
34. See supra notes 21–33 and accompanying text.
35. RHODA OLKIN, WHAT PSYCHOTHERAPISTS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DISABILITY 18 (1999) (“Disability status is associated with certain patterns of
health insurance. Persons with disabilities are less likely to be covered by private health insurance than the nondisabled. Those with severe disabilities are
more likely to be covered by government (vs. private) insurance than are people with no or mild disabilities, and persons with mild disabilities are the most
likely to be uninsured (36%). This latter group might be analogous to those
referred to as the working poor—too much income to qualify for aid and too
little income to be sufficient for needs, particularly given increased costs of living with a disability.”). While the above summary describes the historical
practices of the private, for-profit health-insurance industry, several of the
conventions described above will soon become a thing of the past. Many of the
provisions of the ACA discussed in Part III attempt to dismantle this historically disadvantageous system. See infra Part III.B. Moreover, although Congress clearly intended to eliminate some of the disadvantages produced by the
existing insurance structure when crafting the ACA, I have my reservations
regarding the effectiveness of those provisions. See generally Roberts, supra
note 18 (contending that the ACA protections will ultimately fail to eliminate
the disparities).
36. Barry S. Levy, Twenty-First Century Challenges for Law and Public
Health, 32 IND. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1999) (quoting a 1988 report from the InANCE
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sulted in significant increases in overall life expectancy for
37
Americans. Public health law has many branches, such as environmental law, disease tracking and reporting standards, and
38
statutes mandating involuntary testing and treatment. Public
health law, therefore, seeks to promote health at the community level, usually by preventing members of a population from
getting sick or injured in the first place.
Consequently, people with disabilities occupy a rather
unique role with respect to public health, a role that might explain why they have been markedly absent from most health
39
disparities research. As mentioned, reducing the incidence of
disease and injury in a given population constitutes a central
objective of the public health project. Individuals with disabilities often acquire their impairments through disease and inju40
ry. Hence, the goal of public health—as it relates to individuals with disabilities—has historically been to prevent them
41
from existing in the first place. Instead of construing people
with disabilities as members of the served population, public
health law has instead treated them as the very problems public health policies seek to solve.

stitute of Medicine).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1150–52 (explaining the eight areas of public health law outlined in F. DOUGLAS SCUTCHFIELD & C. WILLIAM KECK, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE (1997)). Those areas are: (1) environmental health laws;
(2) laws and regulations on reporting disease and injury; (3) laws pertaining to
vital statistics; (4) disease and injury control; (5) involuntary testing; (6) contact tracing; (7) immunization and mandatory treatment; and (8) personal restrictions. Id.
39. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 12 (describing
the “dissonance” between “the longstanding public health goal of eliminating
disability and disease and the emerging view . . . defin[ing] disability as a demographic characteristic”).
40. Harlan Hahn has quipped, “Violence is how people with disabilities
reproduce.” Professor Harlan Hahn, Univ. of S. Cal., Lecture to Stigma in Society Class (Fall 2001).
41. In fact, a 1991 report from the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on a
National Agenda for the Prevention of Disabilities (perhaps the committee
name already says it all), makes its primary goal preventing potentially disabling conditions from developing into disabilities and explains that “[d]espite
an officially stated national goal of independence and equality of opportunity
for people with disabilities, current approaches to preventing disability and
improving the lives of people with disabling conditions lack conceptual clarity
and unity of purpose.” INST. OF MEDICINE, DISABILITY IN AMERICA: TOWARD A
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 4 (Andrew M. Pope & Alvin R. Tarlov
eds., 1991).
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People with disabilities have a complex relationship with
health law. While programs such as Medicaid and Medicare
provide them with access to government benefits, the laws and
regulations governing private insurance and public health classify them as at-risk individuals who represent either high potential payouts that may be too costly to insure, or as an undesirable population demographic that should be eliminated.
Thus, several kinds of “health law” directly affect individuals
with disabilities.
2. Civil Rights Law and Disability
In the context of this Article, “civil rights law” means laws
designed to elevate the social standing of a historically disad42
vantaged group. Therefore, the underlying purpose of civil
rights legislation is to eradicate group subordination. Civil
rights statutes prohibit covered entities from discriminating on
43
the basis of a protected trait. As part of their antidiscrimination mandate, they may also require positive differential
treatment, such as the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provi44
sion. The two most prominent civil rights laws for people with
disabilities are the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
The Rehabilitation Act, passed in 1973, requires that entities receiving federal funds provide equal access to their pro45
grams and services for people with disabilities. Its most famous provision, Section 504, states that
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-

42. This definition of civil rights law undeniably embraces
antisubordination. However, given the common understanding of a “civil
rights movement” as an effort to promote the equal social standing of a historically disadvantaged group, I find linking the concept to group subordination
here sensible.
43. I have in the past described an “antidiscrimination paradigm” to connote framing an issue as a matter of untenable discrimination, see Roberts,
supra note 18, at 1163, or to describe particular kinds of legal protections,
mainly antisubordination or anticlassification, see Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 630–34 (2011).
44. Significantly, the ADA definition of to “discriminate” includes “not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
45. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (1998).
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nancial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
46
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.

The Rehabilitation Act constituted landmark legislation at the
time because it—perhaps accidentally—framed the disadvantages and exclusion faced by people with disabilities as “dis47
crimination” and therefore a matter of civil rights. By adopting an antidiscrimination frame, the law provided a catalyst for
48
the American disability rights movement.
Almost twenty years later, President George H.W. Bush
signed the ADA into law. The ADA contains four substantive
49
titles, which prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability
50
51
in employment, local and state government services, public
52
53
accommodations, and telecommunications. People with disabilities, along with their family members and friends, mobilized
to push Congress to pass the ADA, forming what one scholar
54
famously called a “hidden army” for civil rights. However, the
story does not end there. Following a series of restrictive court
interpretations of the ADA, Congress passed the Americans
with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, in an at55
tempt to restore the statute to its original state.

46. Id. § 794(a).
47. See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 123 (2001) (stating that “few foresaw . . .
that Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] . . . would provide the basis for the
disability rights revolution”).
48. Id.
49. Title V of the ADA includes miscellaneous technical provisions. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213.
50. Id. §§ 12111–12117.
51. Id. §§ 12131–12165.
52. Id. §§ 12181–12189.
53. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (amending the Communications Act of 1934).
54. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 117 (1993).
55. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The ADAAA expressly rejected the Supreme Court’s
limited interpretation of disability under the ADA in Sutton and Toyota Motor
Manufacturing. Congress found that “the holdings of the Supreme Court in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases
have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the
ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect,” id. § 2(a)(4), and that “the holding of the Supreme Court in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)
further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the
ADA,” id. § 2(a)(5).
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As mentioned, the health law paradigm predates the civil
56
rights paradigm. Disability rights activists, therefore, made a
57
strategic choice to adopt an alternate legislative paradigm.
Their decision to move away from health law toward civil rights
law had its roots in the goals of the disability rights move58
ment. Thus, following the disability rights movement of the
59
1970s and 1980s, two concurrent, yet mutually exclusive
kinds of legislation applied to people with disabilities: (1)
health laws governing issues related to health-care access and
wellness and (2) civil rights laws prohibiting covered entities
from discriminating on the basis of disability.
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SCHISM
Explanations for the schism between the health and civil
rights paradigms in disability law exist on both sides of the divide. Perhaps, health law- and policy-makers believed that these two concepts existed in tension, adopting the perspective
that “disability” constitutes the absence—or juxtapositional opposite—of “health.” Simultaneously, the disability rights
movement actively adopted the social model of disability, leading advocates to demedicalize disability and to reject the paternalism of the social welfare system.
1. Health Law Explanations
Health law (specifically social benefits, insurance, and public health law) tends to define disability in largely medical
terms. Consequently, those laws do not characterize people
with disabilities as a social group entitled to civil rights.
The concepts of “health” and “disability” have a complicated, long-standing relationship. Health is an elusive concept
with no single universally accepted definition. As a result, bioethical philosophers have written extensively on the meaning of
“health.” The two dominant theories in this area, naturalism
and normativism, illuminate why health and disability may
appear to be mutually exclusive categories, thereby explaining

56. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
57. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that advocates of disability rights viewed antidiscrimination laws as an alternative to civil rights
laws).
58. See infra Part I.B.2.
59. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 19 (explaining that the ADA made no
changes to the existing social benefits program).
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the frequently complicated relationship between these categories within the law.
Naturalism, the most widely accepted philosophical ap60
proach, grounds itself in scientific theory. Naturalists maintain that health exists when an organism is functioning at a
61
normal, biologically natural level. Christopher Boorse, author
of one of the most popular naturalist definitions, presents his
construction of health as a four-part syllogism, which relies
both on the concept of normalcy and the idea of disease as a departure from that state:
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional design; specifically, an age group or a sex of a species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival and reproduction . . . .
3. A disease is a type of internal state which is either an impairment
of normal functional ability, i.e., a reduction of one or more functional
abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on functional ability
caused by the environment.
62
4. Health is the absence of disease.

Boorse, therefore, defines health in the negative. Health occurs
where disease is absent. Boorse uses the term “disease” to signify “an impairment of normal functional ability,” a definition
63
that parallels many of the accepted definitions of “disability.”
Without the concept of a “normal” or healthy body, there is no
64
such thing as an “abnormal” or disabled body. In fact, the very
thing that unites individuals with varying types and degrees of
impairment as members of the group “people with disabilities”
is their shared departure from the accepted norm. In making
“normal” functioning its touchstone, the naturalist approach
puts health and disability in opposition with each other, making them incompatible categories.
60. Marc Ereshefsky, Defining ‘Health’ and ‘Disease,’ 40 STUD. HIST. &
PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 221, 221 (2009).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 222 (quoting Christopher Boorse, A Rebuttal on Health, in
WHAT IS DISEASE? 1, 7–8 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds.,
1997)).
63. All three legal definitions of disability discussed in Part I.C. include
some reference to an impairment that limits functioning.
64. See Lennard J. Davis, Constructing Normalcy, in THE DISABILITY
STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 3 (“To understand the disabled body, one
must return to the concept of the norm, the normal body . . . . I do this because
the ‘problem’ is not the person with disabilities; the problem is the way that
normalcy is constructed to create the ‘problem’ of the disabled person.”).
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Normativism presents an alternative to naturalism. The
normativist approach defines health as a socially valued state,
65
while disease represents a socially undesirable state. This definition may likewise position disability at odds with health. Society has historically devalued people with disabilities. Having
a disability has—in the past—led to the denial of several basic
civil liberties, including the right to vote, the right to marry,
66
and the right to procreate, among others. Society has not
treated people with disabilities as full persons. Moreover, because disability is considered an undesirable state, governments and institutions devote significant resources to the treat67
ing, preventing, or curing of potentially disabling conditions.
Therefore, like in naturalism, the concepts of “health” and “disability” may also exist in tension within normativism, depend68
ing on how society values certain traits.
Even if health and disability are not characterized as perfectly opposed to one another, they still maintain some degree
of inverse relation. As the seriousness of an individual’s disability increases, she can expect her level of health to decrease;
likewise, as an individual’s health declines, her likelihood of
69
manifesting a disabling impairment increases. Thus, while
“health” and “disability” are not always understood as
juxtapositional opposites they are nonetheless related conceptually, making it challenging to define one without at least
70
some reference to the other.
65. Ereshefsky, supra note 60, at 221.
66. Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of
Civil Rights, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 7, 7–8 (Alan
Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) (explaining that people with disabilities constitute “a minority group who [has] been denied basic civil liberties such as the
right to vote, to marry and bear children, to attend school, and to obtain employment”).
67. Contrary to this sentiment, many individuals with disabilities would
not seek a cure of their underlying conditions were it available. See Harlan D.
Hahn & Todd L. Belt, Disability Identity and Attitudes Toward Cure in a
Sample of Disabled Activists, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 453 (2004).
68. It is important to note that in some cultural and historical contexts,
people with disabilities are revered. See CAROLYN L. VASH & NANCY M.
CREWE, PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 31 (2d ed. 2003).
69. One disability scholar has explained the relationship between health
and disability as follows: “[T]hink of two continua, one denoting health and the
other disability. The two continua are not parallel but get closer as severity
increases on each one; that is, the two concepts of health and disability are related, but they are neither completely coincidental nor orthogonal.” OLKIN, supra note 35, at 9–10.
70. Id. (“It is possible to have a disability—for example, [cerebral palsy]—
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Given the frequently oppositional relationship between
health and disability, it stands to reason that legislation intended to promote “health” would likewise seek to cabin “disa71
bility,” as in the context of public health. Further, social benefits law provides resources to those in need. Thus—as a variety
of health law—social welfare legislation construes people with
disabilities as objects of charity or members of the deserving
72
poor. With the seeming conflict between “health” and “disability” it is not surprising that health and civil rights protections
have remained discrete areas of disability law.
Finally, as discussed, the law of health insurance deals
primarily with industry regulation. For-profit health insurers
generate revenue by investing in “good risks” with limited expenses, making accurate risk assessment essential to this system. Hence, the historically predominant approach to American
73
private health insurance has been one of actuarial fairness.
The central tenet of actuarial fairness is that individuals
should be responsible for their own needs, thereby making
widespread risk pooling in health insurance undesirable as the
healthy will inevitably bear the costs of the sick. Conversely,
the solidarity principle maintains that risk-pooling is desirable
to ensure that those who are in need of care can receive it.
Whereas actuarial fairness promotes a norm of personal
74
responsibility, the solidarity principle advocates mutual aid.
Although public benefits programs like Medicare and Medicaid
may intervene to help those deemed deserving, for most of
American history the health insurance industry and its governing laws have preferred an individualized account of fairness
that favors “healthy” people over those with ongoing health-

and also to be in excellent health. However, more serious disabilities often
compromise an individual’s health. . . . [T]he overlap between disability and
illness becomes increasingly important as the conditions on either or both increase in severity. It is probably not possible to come up with a definition of
disability that includes only disability and not illness, and vice versa.”); see
also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 127 (explaining that “a
disability is often incorrectly assumed to determine a person’s general health
status”).
71. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
72. The disability rights movement would reject these constructions of
disability as unduly paternalistic. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying
text.
73. See Stone, supra note 24, at 290 (arguing that actuarial fairness is
“deeply embedded in the structure of competitive markets in insurance”).
74. See id. at 290–94.
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care needs. With the health insurance industry’s desire to assess risk accurately and the relevance of disability to those inquiries, separating health law from civil rights law keeps the
76
actuarial fairness model intact.
To sum up, the relevant areas of health-law regulation do
not construct “disability” as a civil rights issue. While socialbenefits law treats people with disabilities as objects of charity,
public health law views them as problems to be solved. Although not explicitly dealing with disability, health insurance
regulation has traditionally permitted insurers to differentiate
between good and bad health risks. Thus, all three areas of
health law frame disability in more or less medical terms. Because civil rights law protects individuals based on their social
standing, the construction of disability as a medical issue within health law has contributed to the schism in the protections
available to people with disabilities.
2. Civil Rights Law Explanations
Health laws dealing with disability came well before the
civil rights legislation of the 1970s and beyond. Consequently,
in promoting a civil rights model, members of the disability
rights movement actively chose to move away from the existing
legal paradigm. This choice of legislative framework was essen75. See id. at 308 (“The logic and methods of actuarial fairness mean
denying insurance to those who most need medical care. The principle actually
distributes medical care in inverse relation to need, and to the large extent
that commercial insurers operate on this principle, the American reliance on
the private sector as its main provider of health insurance establishes a system that is perfectly and perversely designed to keep sick people away from
doctors.”).
76. As discussed below, the ADA contains a “safe harbor” provision for insurance. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. Whether such an exemption is desirable, however, depends upon the model of health insurance
one adopts: actuarial fairness or solidarity. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Impact of
the ADA on the Health Care System, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 175, 182
(Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (“The ADA’s exemption of
underwriting is reasonable if the industry is regarded strictly as a business. It
is difficult to question the right of the insurance industry to discriminate on
the basis of sound actuarial data. The very essence of underwriting is to classify people according to risk, treating those with higher risks differently. However, if health insurers are viewed as an integral part of health care policy, the
ADA’s exemption of underwriting becomes worrisome. The social purpose of
health insurance is to spread risk across groups, enabling wider access to
health care services. If health benefits become unavailable or unaffordable to
those who are most likely to become ill, the social purpose of health coverage is
thwarted.”).
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tial to their cause. As Justin Dart, a prominent activist popularly known as the father of the ADA, explained: “Around 1980
it became clear to me that we would never overcome the barriers to mainstream participation until the message of our full
humanity was communicated in the consciousness and political
process of America by a strong, highly visible, comprehensive
77
civil rights law.”
Moreover, for many of the disability rights advocates of the
late twentieth century, adopting the civil rights law paradigm
78
meant simultaneously renouncing the health law paradigm.
This “either-or” mentality resulted from a number of characteristics associated with health law.
As explained, health law construes disability as a medical
category. The disability rights movement, however, adopted a
different position, known as the “social model” of disability. The
social model recasts “disability” from a functional limitation to
a limitation imposed by the interaction between a person’s im79
pairment and her physical and social environment. Once disability is understood as a social problem, the focus shifts from
the individual body of the person with a disability to the struc80
tural shortcomings of the society at large. The social model
gives way to the civil rights model: construing disability as a
social category lays the foundation for understanding people
with disabilities as a minority group that has experienced dis81
crimination and oppression. By advocating the social model of
77. JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISAPOLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 91 (2003) (emphasis added)
(quoting Justin W. Dart, Jr., Introduction: The ADA: A Promise to Be Kept, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS xxii (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer
eds., 1993)).
78. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 18 (“[I]n the campaign to enact the
ADA, disability rights activists frequently posed a stark choice between welfare and civil rights approaches.”).
79. Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 75,
85 (2007) (“The social model of disability asserts that contingent social conditions rather than inherent biological limitations constrain individuals’ abilities
and create a disability category.”). See generally Tom Shakespeare, The Social
Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 266–
72 (explaining the application of the social model theory in Britain).
80. See Shakespeare, supra note 79, at 268 (“Impairment is distinguished
from disability. The former is individual and private, the latter is structural
and public.”).
81. Harlan Hahn equates people with disabilities to “other oppressed
groups” distinguished from the majority by a particular trait, citing such
common experiences as segregation and severe poverty. Harlan Hahn, AdverBILITY
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disability, those activists reframed the historical exclusion of
people with disabilities from the result of functional limitations
to an issue of civil rights.
Part of demedicalizing disability involves rejecting the traditional connotations of normalcy that are so essential to the
82
naturalist understanding of health. Proponents of disability
rights, therefore, used the language of equality to attack what
it means to be normal. As one disability scholar and advocate
opined:
There is nothing a health care provider can do that will make us
‘normal.’ The problem is not the use of a wheelchair, but the concept
of what is normal. People who use wheelchairs are quite normal. We
are different, but normal. We have a right to be different and a right
83
to be treated equally.

By rejecting the medical model of disability and the underlying
notion of statistical normalcy as desirable, disability rights activists moved away from the traditional goals of treatment and
cure. Under the social framework, the solution to their historical oppression and exclusion lay not in medical science but in
civil rights.
Another related ideological move within the disability
rights movement was the rejection of paternalistic attitudes
84
toward people with disabilities. The medical model construed
tising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL’Y
STUD. J. 551, 553 (1987); see also OLKIN, supra note 35, at 36 (explaining the
“disability experience” as one that involves the “prejudice, stigma, and discrimination which is common to all minority groups”). But see SHAPIRO, supra
note 54, at 126 (“The disability rights movement spanned a splintered universe. There are hundreds of different disabilities, and each group tended to
see its issues in relation to its specific disability.”); SWITZER, supra note 77, at
70 (“There is some disagreement about whether disabled persons fit into the
social movement typology because they do not represent a minority group in
the traditional sense of the word and therefore should not be regarded in the
sense of a class of individuals. Nor are they sufficiently united in their discrimination.”). More recently, some disability scholars have challenged the
framing of people with disabilities as an oppressed minority as inconsistent
with the other goals of the disability rights movement. See Andrew I. Batavia,
The New Paternalism: Portraying People with Disabilities as an Oppressed
Minority, 12 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 107, 112 (2001) (“Characterizing the
population of people with disabilities as an oppressed minority . . . is a strategy destined to sustain people with disabilities in a state of subsistence.”).
82. See generally Davis, supra note 64 (explaining the relatively new origins of the current meaning of the word “normal” and the framing of the “average” as the “ideal” in medical science).
83. SWITZER, supra note 77, at 7–8 (quoting David Pfeiffer).
84. Batavia, supra note 81, at 112 (explaining that the disability rights
movement “specifically rejected the paternalism of the medical model of disability, which characterized people with disabilities as dependent patients who
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people with disabilities as dependents in need of assistance and
care. Frequently, individuals with disabilities were not active
participants in the decisions regarding their own treatment,
85
medical and otherwise. Thus, the disability rights movement
sought to free people with disabilities from the oppressive (yet
arguably well-meaning) hold of family, friends, and social insti86
tutions.
At the time of the early disability rights movement, its
staunch rejection of both the medical model and the historically
paternalistic attitudes toward people with disabilities made
health law a wholly undesirable tool for pursuing the goals of
access, independence, and integration.
To start, both health insurance regulation and public
health law contain strong medical components. Health insurance law governs a market that provides insureds with access
to medical care. However, the removal of structural barriers—
both physical and attitudinal—was at the heart of the disability rights movement. Thus, not only was insurance law illequipped to achieve the movement’s primary objectives, but
even attempting to reform the health insurance system to improve coverage for people with disabilities could reify the construction of disability as a medical state.
Similarly, public health law frames its goals in medical
terms. As noted, the historical position of public health has
been that disability is something to be reduced and eventually
eliminated. Employing a legislative paradigm that seeks to
eradicate the very existence of people with disabilities seems
counterintuitive to a movement designed to promote their
equality and full citizenship. Further, it would not be surprising if members of the disability rights movement had significant reticence with respect to public health legislation. One of
the most shameful public health initiatives in American history—the eugenics movement of the nineteenth and twentieth
87
centuries—targeted people with disabilities.
must be cared for by the medical establishment and who were often cared for
in a manner that did not satisfy their interests”).
85. See id.
86. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 7 (“One overarching goal is a negative one:
freedom from the control of paternalistic parents, professionals, institutions,
and welfare bureaucracies.”).
87. During this time states enacted laws to sterilize the “feeble-minded.”
See SWITZER, supra note 77, at 36–38. Probably the most famous statesanctioned sterilization was that of Carrie Buck, the subject of the stillinfamous holding in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). These forced steriliza-
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Moreover, social benefits law was a similarly unappealing
tool. The disability rights movement by and large rejected the
88
social welfare system as unduly oppressive and paternalistic.
Advocates critiqued the programs on at least three different,
yet related, grounds. Some believed that the benefits themselves represented an effort to pay off a potentially bothersome
89
group. Others maintained that disability-specific benefits
promoted a culture of dependence and a “welfare mentality”
90
that ran counter to the goal of independent living. Finally,
certain members of the disability rights movement believed
that the beneficence of the social welfare programs simply
masked a deep-seated discomfort regarding people with disabil91
ities. Civil rights law, therefore, presented an attractive alternative: people with disabilities could achieve independence
through civil rights and no longer need the paternalistic bene92
fits provided by social welfare.
Thus, the conceptual dissonance between traditional connotations of “health” and “disability,” the reframing of disability as a social—not medical—category, and the rejection of paternalism led advocates of disability rights initially to keep
health and civil rights protections distinct.

tions carried on well into the latter half of the twentieth century, with individuals sterilized against their wills continuing to come forward today. See,
e.g., Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at A1.
88. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 5 (“Much of the thinking of the disability
rights movement in this country developed as a reaction to the perceived paternalism and oppression that attended a welfare-based response to disability.”). Samuel Bagenstos has written prolifically on this topic.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 15–16.
91. Id. at 16–17; see also Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 41, 43 (1996) (arguing that superficial sympathy and pity “has perpetuated
the segregation and inequality of [disabled persons’] segment in society”).
92. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 5 (“By the 1970s, many disability
rights advocates were presenting antidiscrimination laws as an alternative to
social welfare provision for people with disabilities—a tool that would obviate
welfare programs by giving people with disabilities opportunities to make a
living on their own.”); id. at 10 (“[M]any disability rights activists sought to
change the social welfare orientation of disability law. Those activists argued
that welfare is oppressive and stifling and that antidiscrimination and accommodation requirements would enable people with disabilities to leave the
benefits rolls and enter the workforce.”).
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C. IMPLICATIONS
Separating the health and civil rights models affects the
kind of legal protections available to people with disabilities.
The way in which the ADA—a civil rights statute—deals with
employer-provided health insurance—an area governed by
health law—exemplifies how “health law” and “civil rights” law
operate separately in the context of disability. The ADA includes a so-called “safe harbor” provision, which provides that
health insurance providers may engage in risk assessment
93
practices for underwriting and rating purposes, so long as
those practices do not constitute “subterfuge” to evade the stat94
ute’s purpose. While Congress’s intent in drafting this provi95
sion is not entirely clear, including a health-insurance safe
harbor at a minimum indicates a desire to leave traditional in96
surance practices intact. Arguably, Congress did not want a
federal civil rights statute intruding into the area of primarily
state-governed health law regulation.

93. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (2006) (“Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict—(1) an
insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or (2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, or observing or
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on
or not inconsistent with State law; or (3) a person or organization covered by
this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, or observing or administering the
terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate
insurance.”).
94. Id. (“Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.”).
95. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 78 (noting that “[t]he
meaning and application of Section 501(c) have been the source of much confusion and the subject of much litigation”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at
38 (describing the provision as “nearly inscrutable”).
96. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 85 (“[T]he legislative
history of the ADA contains some indication that Congress did indeed include
the safe harbor in order to make perfectly clear that the ADA would not require insurance companies to change how they conducted their underwriting
or risk classification practices.”); Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy, supra note 18, at 95 (“Congress’s inclusion of the insurance safe harbor reflected a conscious decision not to disrupt traditional underwriting practices by insurers.”); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability:
The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 340 (1990)
(stating that, because of the safe harbor provision, the ADA “cannot be read as
a mandated insurance law”).
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Further, quite tellingly, the law cannot decide on a unified
way of defining disability. Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act employ a definition of disability that includes social elements. They define “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair97
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
Although impairment-based, this definition—especially the
“regarded as” provision—still communicates an understanding
of disability as social category. To begin, the definition separates the “disability” (social condition) from the “impairment”
(medical condition).
Part of the social model’s contribution to disability theory
was distinguishing the shared social experience of disability
98
from a given individual’s functional ability. For example, a
person who uses a wheelchair may have a mobility impairment,
such as difficulty walking. However, she may not experience
that condition as disabling until she attempts to enter a building with a stairwell or a narrow doorway. Thus, the impairment—difficulty walking—is distinct from the disability—a
lack of access.
The civil rights law definition of disability, found in the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, reflects this distinction. It
99
separates “impairment” from “disability,” indicating they are
not one and the same. Pursuant to the definition, an impairment only becomes disabling when it leads to some kind of tangible restriction on a person’s ability to function in her environment, in the form of a substantial limitation on a major life
100
activity.
Furthermore, including individuals “regarded as”
disabled indicates that a person may experience disability—
such as exclusion, disadvantage, or a lack of access—even ab101
sent a substantially limiting impairment. The “regarded as”
prong eliminates the need to establish an underlying medical

97. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. V 2011). The Rehabilitation Act defines
disability almost identically. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2006).
98. See MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 12–24 (1990) (arguing that both impairment and disability are
socially constructed).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1).
100. Id.
101. Similarly, the “record of” provision indicates that a person may continue to experience disability, even after the impairment no longer substantially limits her.
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102

condition. That is not to say the civil rights law definition is
completely social in nature. While containing aspects of the social model, scholars have criticized both the disability/impairment binary generally and the ADA definition specifically for ultimately relying too heavily on a medicalized
103
understanding of disability.
On the contrary, the social welfare definition of disability
relies more heavily on functional limitation, as well as an ina104
bility to perform wage work. The Social Security Act defines
disability as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous pe105
riod of not less than 12 months.” The definition has a strong
diagnostic feel: the impairment must be “medically determinable” and carrying a poor prognosis—at least a year of duration
or resulting in death. Moreover, predicating benefits on a
medicalized understanding of disability means that, improvements in functioning may lead to an individual’s benefits being
106
terminated.
Thus, individuals with temporary or episodic
conditions who qualify for support may choose not to reenter
102. Perhaps because the “regarded as” definition of disability does not require the existence of an underlying impairment, Congress eliminated the
availability of reasonable accommodation for claims brought under solely under that prong. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h).
103. Brad Areheart takes on the binary both conceptually and as applied.
Bradley A. Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011);
see also Ramona L. Paetzold, Why Incorporate Disability Studies into Teaching
Discrimination Law?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 61, 74–76 (2010) (explaining
the philosophical shortcomings of both the social model, with its distinction
between impairment and disability, and the ADA).
104. Social welfare and civil rights law defined disability differently. Possibly because of the redistributive aim of the benefits programs, the civil rights
definition of disability is more expansive than its social welfare counterpart.
See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 295 (“Unlike civil rights
approaches, benefits statutes seek to provide material resources to address
disability discrimination. They are social welfare statutes and are intended to
be redistributive in nature. Social welfare statutes restrict disability status to
limit expenditures rather than to limit protected class status to those with a
history of oppression. Perhaps as a result, the definition of disability is more
restrictive under benefits statutes than under civil rights statutes.”).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2006).
106. Samuel Bagenstos has noted the fear of losing benefits to be of substantial concern for people with disabilities. Consequently, even in light of
medical improvement, beneficiaries may remain out of the labor force.
Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 32–34 (describing how the current structure of the
public health insurance system creates a psychological investment in unemployment).
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the workforce out of the fear that should their condition return
107
they would no longer be eligible.
Public health and insurance law also adopt medical, functional definitions of disability. For example, the Dictionary of
Public Health defines disability as the “[r]educed capacity of a
person to perform usual functions, usually the consequence of
an impairment, such as impaired mobility or intellectual im108
pairment.” Likewise, the Dictionary of Health Insurance and
Managed Care adopts a definition very similar to the social
welfare iteration, explaining that a disability is “[a] physical or
mental impairment caused by accident or illness that partially
or totally limits one’s ability to perform duties of his or her own
occupation or any occupation for which the individual is rea109
sonably suited by education, training, or experience.” (Importantly, the definition of disability may also vary pursuant to
110
individual policies and programs. ) Thus, while sometimes
distinguishing disability from impairment, health law definitions are more medical in nature and place greater weight on
the existence and effect of the underlying impairment than the
civil rights definitions.
The differing legislative paradigms associated with disability law have led to confusion regarding the legal meaning of
“disability,” as well as who qualifies as “a person with a disabil111
ity.” As demonstrated in the following Part, the separation
between health and civil rights law has led to shortcomings in
the legal protections available to people with disabilities, particularly with respect to gaining meaningful access to health
care.
Summing up, protections for people with disabilities have
historically been split between two substantive legal paradigms: health law and civil rights law. That rift stems at least
in part from how we understand disability: a predominantly
medical conceptualization favors the health law paradigm,
107. See id.
108. A DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 94 (John M. Last ed., 2007). But see
J.E. SCHMIDT, 2 ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE & WORD FINDER D-157
(2011) (adopting the first prong of the ADA’s definition of “disability”).
109. DICTIONARY OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE 88 (David
Edward Marcinko ed., 2006).
110. Id. (“In life and health insurance policies or government benefit programs, definitions of disability may vary.”).
111. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795,
797 (1999) (holding that the “pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not
automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA claim”).
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whereas a predominantly social conceptualization favors the
civil rights paradigm. While the civil rights statutes described
above facially apply to various kinds of health-care providers,
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have failed to facilitate
equality, access, and integration for people with disabilities in
the context of health care.
II. HEALTH-CARE ACCESS FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES
While advocates of disability rights construe discrimination based on disability as a social—not medical—problem,
health-care access presents unique challenges for individuals
with disabilities. This Part examines the pervasive inequalities
experienced by people with disabilities with respect to health
care and the failure of the civil rights laws, specifically the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, to address these notable
shortcomings.
A. HEALTH DISPARITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Although some disability scholars maintain that “illness” is
112
not in and of itself a disability rights issue, people with disa112. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 300 (citing Satz,
Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5,
at 561–67). Satz makes this distinction because while “disability” and “illness”
may overlap, they are not identical categories. Id. at 300–01 (“Individuals who
are sick may not be disabled, and vice-versa. Further, access to adequate
health care, in terms of both coverage and the range of medical services available, is a problem for individuals with and without disabilities. While disability may seem to raise some complicating factors—including a possible higher
consumption of health care resources than most individuals, health care rationing schemes that disfavor those with medical impairments, and difficulty
moving between public assistance programs that include health care and the
workforce—these are problems that individuals without disabilities face as
well.”); see also Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, at 561 (“First and foremost, disability does not equate
with illness. The population of individuals who are ill or medically fragile exceeds the disability class. Illness may give rise to disability, but it does not
presuppose it.”). Instead, she views illness as universalizing principle that
demonstrates our shared vulnerability. Id. at 552 (“Illness is perhaps the
prime example of a universal and constant vulnerability. When manifest, it
significantly heightens other vulnerabilities for disabled and nondisabled people alike; it is not a disability issue.”). In my previous scholarship, I myself
have distinguished between the concepts of “healthism” (discrimination on the
basis of health status) and “ableism” (discrimination on the basis of
(dis)ability). See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1171 n.68 (differentiating
healthism and ableism). However, simply because some of the challenges faced
by people with disabilities also affect individuals outside the disability com-

2013]

DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW

1991

bilities have on-going health-care needs related to their impairments. Obtaining health services is, therefore, of particular
113
importance to members of the disability community. However, individuals with disabilities experience significant barriers
with regard to their ability to access care, resulting in substan114
tial health disparities.
Research reveals that people with disabilities endure numerous types of inequities with respect to their health. Despite
using health services at a greater rate than people without disabilities, individuals with disabilities report lower levels of
115
overall health, including a higher incidence of secondary con116
ditions. Further, although people with disabilities consume
health care more frequently, they enjoy less access to preven117
tive measures. Barriers to accessing care—like antiquated
medical equipment or insufficient training—disproportionately
118
impact the disability community.
Thus, while disability
rights advocates champion understanding disability as primari119
ly a social issue, on a purely practical level certain impairments may result in the need for various health services. An
munity does not diminish their importance, severity, or pervasiveness as issues of health-care access specifically for people with disabilities.
113. Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 53 (noting that “because
many persons with disabilities have ongoing and sometimes extensive health
care needs as a result of their disabilities, legal protection against discrimination in accessing health care services can be of critical importance”); see also
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 9–10 (explaining that
“[p]eople with disabilities comprise the largest and most important health care
consumer group in the United States”).
114. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1 (finding that
“[p]eople with disabilities experience significant health disparities and barriers to health care, as compared with people who do not have disabilities”); see
also Karen Hwang et al., Access and Coordination of Health Care Service for
People with Disabilities, 20 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 28, 28 (2009) (stating
that for people with disabilities the risk of suboptimal care is “especially problematic because individuals with disabilities face multiple barriers to receiving
quality health care services, ranging from structural barriers (e.g., physical
access to doctors’ offices) to procedural barriers (e.g., difficulty scheduling appointments, problems obtaining insurance coverage)”).
115. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 9, 23; see also id. at
34–35 (“About half of people with complex limitations and one-third of people
with basic actions difficulties assessed their health status as fair or poor, compared with the three-fourths of adults who did not have a disability who assessed their health as excellent or very good.”).
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id. at 9, 23.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
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inability to access those necessary services lowers the overall
level of health for many individuals with disabilities.
In analyzing the reasons behind these disparities, an additional discussion of health insurance provides a logical point of
departure. People with disabilities frequently find themselves
120
either un- or under-insured. Not only do barriers to obtaining
health insurance limit access to coverage, but—because of the
cost of health services—access to health insurance also serves
121
as a proxy for access to health care generally. Significantly,
people with disabilities encounter numerous obstacles to accessing care within both the private and the public healthinsurance systems.
1. Public Benefits and Health Disparities
As discussed, most people with disabilities who have
health insurance are insured through government-run pro122
grams, such as Medicaid and Medicare. In fact, Medicaid has
been described as the “largest single source of health insurance
and long-term care and the largest source of public financial
123
support for people with disabilities.” Although public health
insurance serves as an important resource for individuals with
120. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1 (finding that
“[p]eople with disabilities frequently lack either health insurance or coverage
for necessary services, such as specialty care, long-term services, prescription
medications, durable medical equipment, and assistive technologies”); id. at
11–12 (noting that “[t]he health care system in the United States is complex,
highly fragmented, and sometimes overly restrictive in terms of program eligibility . . . leav[ing] some people with disabilities with no health care coverage
and others with cost-sharing obligations and limits on benefits that prevent
them from obtaining health-preserving prescription medications, medical
equipment, specialty care, dental and vision care, long-term care, and care coordination”).
121. See Katherine Unger Davis, Racial Disparities in Childhood Obesity:
Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 313, 314
n.5 (2011) (“Because ‘health insurance facilitates entry into the health care
system,’ levels of insurance coverage have been used as a proxy to analyze access to healthcare more generally.” (quoting AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 113 (2007),
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr07/nhdr07.pdf)); see also NAT’L
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 38 (explaining that “[i]nsurance
coverage tends to determine whether people with disabilities visit a doctor
regularly or have access to a usual source of medical care”).
122. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
123. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 110 (quoting Helping
Families with Needed Care: Medicaid’s Role for People with Disabilities: Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Health
110th Cong. 22 (2008) (testimony of Diane Rowland)).
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disabilities in need of health care, those programs are not without their limitations. For instance, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal funding agencies responsible for those programs, collect data related to the public
health insurance system but do not assess the compliance of
124
those programs with the ADA.
Despite being the primary source of health insurance for
people with disabilities, Medicaid has several shortcomings
that contribute to the health disparities experienced by the disability community. First, beneficiaries have trouble locating
125
health-care providers who will accept Medicaid payments.
Thus, low-income people with disabilities encounter programmatic barriers even before the treatment relationship begins.
Furthermore, structural problems persist after a Medicaid recipient finds a physician willing to accept her. Health-care professionals who serve Medicaid recipients with disabilities report impediments to providing care resulting from improper
126
referrals and accessibility issues.
Medicaid managed care
programs suffer from poor coordination of care, reduced consumer choice, and a limited ability to access specialists, thereby
127
negatively impacting health care for people with disabilities.
Additionally, Medicaid only provides limited coverage. It fails
to cover many essential services, such as dental, vision, and
128
personal assistance, as well as durable medical equipment.
124. Id. at 21 (“Federal health care funding agencies such as the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) do not conduct oversight of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) architectural and programmatic accessibility
compliance by states, health plans, and medical providers or assess health
providers’ disability cultural competence.”).
125. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 45.
126. Hwang et al., supra note 114, at 29 (“A Texas survey of 62 general
practitioners, family practitioners, internists, and obstetrician-gynecologists
serving Medicaid recipients revealed that despite the requirements of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, a substantial portion of primary care physicians are unable to serve people with disabilities, owing to inappropriate referrals and structural inaccessibility.”).
127. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 88 (“In some cases,
Medicaid managed care programs are poorly equipped to meet the needs of
people with disabilities . . . . Problem areas include inadequate care coordination, limited access to specialists, limited consumer choice, and inadequate
risk adjustment for capitation rates.”).
128. Id. at 45 (“For many of these low-income beneficiaries, however, essential health care services—including dental and vision care, medical supplies, and durable medical equipment—may be out of reach financially, even
with low cost-sharing under Medicaid.”); see also Hwang et al., supra note 114,
at 29 (“Among a sample of 502 Missouri residents with disabilities who were
receiving Medicaid services in central Missouri, nearly two thirds reported dif-
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Lastly, while Medicaid includes a home health benefit, states
129
can limit coverage based on factors like “medical necessity.”
Many “optional” services may actually be necessary for people
130
with certain kinds of disabilities to function.
Taken as a
whole, these structural and programmatic barriers lead to
health disparities for individuals with disabilities insured
131
through Medicaid. It is, therefore, not surprising that Medicaid recipients have expressed dissatisfaction with the program
132
and its benefits.
Medicare also has its limits. Medicare recipients pay more
133
out-of-pocket than their Medicaid counterparts.
These increased costs may lead Medicare beneficiaries to choose to forgo
134
necessary care or equipment. Like Medicaid, Medicare does
not cover a variety of important health services, including vi135
sion, dental, or long-term care. Moreover, people under sixtyfive who wish to qualify for Medicare through SSDI must wait

ficulties in obtaining needed health care services—particularly dental, optometric, and personal assistance services.”).
129. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 110 (“The category of
‘medical supplies, equipment and appliances suitable for use in the home’ is a
mandatory home health service benefit, but a state can establish reasonable
standards under the Medicaid statute and set limits on coverage based on
such factors as ‘medical necessity’ or ‘utilization control.’”).
130. Id. (“The distinction between mandatory and optional services can be
particularly important for people with disabilities, because many optional services can be critical to maintaining health and the ability to function in the
community.”).
131. Id. at 111 (“A state’s tolerance of structural and programmatic barriers in the multiple levels of its health care system is an ongoing violation of
the Medicaid program and greatly contributes to the health care disparities
endured by people with disabilities.”).
132. Hwang et al., supra note 114, at 29 (“In a 1999–2000 national survey,
Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities reported dissatisfaction in key areas of
access and care.”).
133. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 45.
134. Id. (“Both Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries . . . have reported difficulties obtaining the care and services they require. With higher copayments,
Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities report significant cost-related problems including forgoing needed equipment, postponing care, and paying for
long-term care.”).
135. Id. at 113 (“[T]he program contains significant gaps in coverage benefits for items or services that can be both expensive and particularly important
for maintaining function and independence. For instance, Medicare does not
pay for long-term care services at home or in an institution, routine dental
care or dentures, routine vision care or eyeglasses, or hearing exams hearing
aids.”).
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136

two years to obtain coverage. During that period, many of
137
them go uninsured.
Given these limitations, disability rights advocates have
recommended that CMS update their definitions of “medical
equipment” and “medical necessity” and pay for interpreters,
rehabilitative services, and assistive technologies for people
138
with disabilities to address these health disparities.
2. Private Health Insurance and Health Disparities
Characteristics of the private insurance market likewise
contribute to the health disparities faced by people with disabilities. As discussed, insurers may exclude them outright or may
139
impose limitations or caps on what the policy covers. Further,
140
health-status based rating has compounded the problem.
Traditionally when insurers have offered policies to individuals
with disabilities, those policies came with heightened premi141
ums. Even in the group health-insurance system, people with
disabilities are likely to pay more out-of-pocket because of costsharing mechanisms, like deductibles and co-payments, com142
bined with their increased need for medical services. Yet, beyond the difficulties discussed in the preceding part, people
with disabilities also experience substantial barriers to obtaining equipment and services that are essential to their healthcare needs.
Similar to the structural impediments people with disabilities encounter in public health insurance, certain aspects of
private health insurance may thwart their access to needed
136. Id. at 45 (“Medicare imposes a 2-year waiting period for coverage for
individuals who are under age 65 who become eligible for the program when
they receive Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).”).
137. Id. at 113 (“Another serious gap involves people who become disabled
before age 65. They must wait 2 years after they establish eligibility for SSDI
before they can receive Medicare coverage, a period during which many do not
have any insurance coverage.”).
138. Id. at 95 (recommending that “the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) should update their current definitions of durable medical
equipment and medical necessity, which are outdated and give little consideration to increasing an individual’s functional status”); id. at 94–95 (recommending that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services pay for interpreters, rehabilitative services, and assistive technologies for people with
disabilities).
139. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
141. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28.
142. See supra note 29.
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care, thereby leading to health disparities. Samuel Bagenstos
identifies two characteristics of the private health-insurance
industry that substantially restrict the care available to people
with disabilities: (1) emphasizing acute care and (2) limiting
143
coverage to “medically necessary” treatments.
Health care generally focuses on addressing acute—not on144
going—needs.
Perhaps the centrality of acute care stems
from the notion that “health” is the default state, making dis145
ease or disability exceptional events. Under such a model, the
goal of medical care is not to provide chronic treatment but rather to restore health following isolated incidents of disease or
injury. Because people with disabilities often have on-going
health-care needs, the focus on acute care means that private
health insurance will not cover those required services over the
146
long-term. The resulting gaps in coverage impede the ability
of individuals with disabilities to obtain needed health services,
thus leading to health disparities.
Moreover, like their government-funded counterparts,
many private health insurers have not traditionally provided
adequate coverage for assistive technologies or durable medical
147
equipment. Policies that limit their coverage to “medically
necessary” treatments have invoked those clauses to deny
payment for any number of assistive devices, including hearing
148
aids, prostheses, and even wheelchairs. Further exacerbating
the problem, private health insurers have chosen to limit their
annual payments for durable medical equipment irrespective of
149
its medical necessity. Not having access to needed equipment
143. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 30 (“Two aspects of private insurance
largely account for this effect: (1) the tilt of insurance policies toward acute, as
opposed to chronic care; and (2) the typical requirement that covered treatments be ‘medically necessary.’”).
144. Hwang et al., supra note 114, at 31 (noting that “[t]raditional models
of health care delivery have generally been designed for acute rather than
chronic care”).
145. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 306 (explaining
that “[w]ithin social contract theory, disability and illness are not viewed as
part of the human experience, but rather as exceptional”).
146. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that for private health insurers
will cover a treatment “when it is a short-term response to an acute condition,
but not when it is a continuing response to a chronic condition”).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 31–32.
149. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 46 (“[P]rivate insurance plans increasingly limit annual payments for durable medical equipment
such as wheelchairs, crutches, braces, and ventilators, regardless of medical
necessity and at a level that makes the individual’s out-of-pocket costs for
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and services negatively impacts the health of individuals with
disabilities.
Inaccessible medical equipment also contributes to the
150
health disparities experienced by people with disabilities. As
a result, people with disabilities may be unable to obtain basic
preventive care services because of inaccessible exam tables
and screening equipment, thereby leading to later detection
and treatment of serious health conditions such as breast, cer151
vical, and prostate cancers. These factors contribute to both a
lower level of overall health and higher incidence of late detec152
tion and secondary conditions. In a particularly chilling example, a woman who used a wheelchair approached her doctor
153
regarding a lump in her breast.
In lieu of performing a
mammogram, her physician concluded that she had over154
developed her pectoral muscle from using her wheelchair.
155
Later, she was diagnosed with breast cancer. By that time,
156
the cancer was terminal. She died within three years.
3. Public Health and Health Disparities
Although people with disabilities face substantial health
disparities, public health research has historically failed to recognize people with disabilities as a health disparities popula157
tion with its own unique health-care needs.
higher priced items such as motorized wheelchairs prohibitively expensive.”).
150. Elizabeth Pendo has written extensively on the topic of inaccessible
medical equipment as an impediment to health care access for people with
disabilities. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pendo, Disability, Equipment Barriers, and
Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide Meaningful Access, 2 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 15, 17 (2008); Elizabeth Pendo, Reducing Disparities
Through Health Care Reform: Disability and Accessible Medical Equipment, 4
UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2010) [hereinafter Pendo, Reducing Disparities].
151. See Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1060–65 (describing the affect of inaccessible examination tables, examination chairs, weight
scales, and X-ray and other imaging equipment on access to preventative services and screenings for people with disabilities); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 49 (explaining that health-care providers “frequently conduct examinations or diagnostic tests while patients are seated in
their wheelchairs, which can generate inaccurate test results or conceal physician evidence required for appropriate diagnosis and treatment”).
152. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 56.
153. Id. at 58.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The term “health disparity” holds multiple meanings. NAT’L COUNCIL
ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 29 (“The phrase ‘health disparity’ is widely
used in the articulation of health care research, funding, and service delivery
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Prior to 2010, the majority of federally funded research
programs did not recognize people with disabilities as a health
158
disparities population. The Department of Health and Human Services first recognized “disability” as a relevant population for public health purposes in 2010, when the Surgeon General issued the report Call to Action to Improve the Health and
Wellness of Persons with Disabilities and when Healthy People
159
2010 defined disability as a demographic trait. Yet despite
this limited inclusion, major federal public health entities—
most notably the National Center on Minority Health and
Health Disparities—still do not include people with disabilities
160
in their health disparities research. Moreover, because no
single federal agency acts as a clearinghouse for disabilityrelated public health information, any research related to peo161
ple with disabilities and health-care access occurs piecemeal.
It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain the true extent of public
162
health initiatives impacting individuals with disabilities.
These shortcomings have resulted in a lack of comprehensive
data documenting the experiences of individuals with disabilities in obtaining health care. This absence ultimately hinders
the development of coherent, coordinated public health efforts
163
targeting the disability community.
priorities by both public and private organizations. The exact definition of
health disparity varies. In some cases, it includes many population subgroups
and indicators; in other cases, it is narrowly restricted to specific populations
and health conditions. In broad terms, ‘health disparity’ can be defined as ‘differences in health outcomes and health care access that occur between specific
populations and the general population’ . . . . In most instances in the United
States, when the phrase ‘health disparity’ is used, it is understood to describe
circumstances in which differences are interpreted to indicate bias or unacceptable disproportion in health outcomes, aspects of health care system access, or differences in health treatment for one group compared with the general population.”).
158. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Id. at 12–13.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at 13 (“Specific structural problems evident Federal agency disability research functionally impede the development of a unified, coherent plan
for disability and health research and program development. Specifically, (1)
the level of funding and research is wholly inadequate to spur a coherent investigative strategy that will inform policy and planning for the growing number of people who will acquire disabilities with age and for the overall future
impact of disability on society; and (2) within the Federal research community,
commitment to disability health disparities and health promotion research is
weak, and coordination mechanisms are lacking.”).
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Given the lack of good, reliable data on disability and
health-care access, perhaps it comes as no surprise that medical professionals lack adequate training regarding disability
competency. The treatment needs of people with disabilities are
164
not traditionally part of core medical curriculum,
leaving
many health-care professionals uneducated in meeting the
needs of the disability community. This ignorance ranks among
the most significant obstacles to adequate health care that peo165
ple with disabilities face. Consequently, disability rights advocates have pushed for additional research into the barriers to
166
health-care access faced by people with disabilities.
Thus, the ubiquitous physical and structural barriers people with disabilities regularly encounter permeate all aspects of
their lives, including their ability to access health care. Significantly, an inability to obtain needed health services adversely
167
affects other areas of people’s lives, such as employment.
While civil rights law may facially cover various areas of
health-care delivery, those statutes have by and large been ineffective in ensuring adequate access to care for the disability
community.
B. FAILURE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM
People with disabilities experience serious health disparities. Although designed to improve access and integration for
164. Id. at 13 (“Disability competency is not a core curriculum requirement
for (1) accreditation or receipt of Federal funding for most medical and dental
schools and other professional health care training institutions; or (2) for hospitals to participate in federally funded medical student internship and residency programs. In addition, applicants who seek either a medical or other
professional health care license are generally not required to demonstrate disability competency.”).
165. Id.; see also id. at 49 (explaining that “health care providers hold incorrect assumptions and stereotypes about people with disabilities, which can
affect every aspect of care and can result in inadequate and inappropriate
care”).
166. See, e.g., id. at 125 (suggesting that if the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality “promoted research that clearly identified the various barriers encountered by people with disabilities as a priority population when
seeking health care, it could help advocates document a statistically accurate
record of, for example, the extent to which health care technologies, facilities,
and equipment remain inaccessible to people with disabilities and bolster efforts to effect change”).
167. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 22–23 (noting the failure of the ADA
to improve the level of employment for people with disabilities); id. at 26–27
(attributing that failure in part to the structure of the pre-ACA healthinsurance system and its resulting barriers to access).

2000

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1963

the disability community, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
have failed to have a lasting impact in the area of health care.
This failure can in part be attributed to the statutes’ civil rights
168
structure.
The failure of the civil rights paradigm, however, does not
stem from an explicit lack of coverage. Both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA extend to health-care settings. As noted, the
Rehabilitation Act requires federally funded entities to ensure
equal access to their programs and services for people with dis169
abilities. The statute, therefore, applies to clinics, hospitals,
and other health-care providers that accept federal monies,
170
such as Medicare or Medicaid. Further, the relevant regulations prohibit covered entities from providing any benefit or
service that denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from Medicaid, affords people with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from health
care services that are not equal to that afforded others, or provides people with disabilities an aid, benefit or service that is
171
not as effective as that provided to others. Despite its applicability, the courts have been reluctant to interpret the Rehabilitation Act’s protections aggressively with respect to is172
sues of health care.
Similarly, certain provisions of the ADA also apply—at
least facially—to health-care providers. The ADA’s legislative
history indicates that people with disabilities encountered nu173
merous barriers to accessing health care, and the findings of
the original statute stated that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas
168. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 88–89 (proposing
that part of the ADA’s failure to improve health-care access for people with
disabilities is attributable to the fact that “the ADA is a civil rights statute,
not a health care reform statute”).
169. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
170. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 99 (“Section 504 prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified people with disabilities under any program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance; it directly applies to state Medicaid agencies and the many corporate health care
entities and providers that receive Federal monies through Medicaid, Medicare, or Federal block grants.”).
171. 34 C.F.R. § 104.52(a) (2013).
172. Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 53 (explaining that
courts took a “hands-off approach to health care issues” with respect to Section
504).
173. Id. at 51 (“[T]he voluminous legislative history that underpins the
ADA includes ample testimony regarding the barriers that people with disabilities faced in obtaining health care.”).
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174

as . . . health services.” Thus, barriers to health-care access
were among the impediments Congress sought to dismantle
when passing the ADA.
As written, the ADA applies to both public and private
175
health care providers. Title II covers state and local entities,
including public health programs and providers that accept
176
state funding like Medicaid. It provides that government institutions cannot exclude, deny benefits to, or discriminate
177
against qualified individuals with disabilities. Likewise, Title
III, which governs privately owned “public accommodations,”
178
applies to physicians’ offices and hospitals,
regardless of
179
whether the provider is operating out of a private residence.
That provision prevents commercial entities from denying people with disabilities the full and equal enjoyment of their goods
180
and services. The law requires the programs, vendors, and
service-providers covered by Titles II and III to make reasonable modifications to facilitate the equitable participation of in181
dividuals with disabilities.
Thus, the ADA arguably man174. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006).
175. See id. § 12131(1).
176. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 99 (stating that
“State Medicaid agencies . . . fall under Title II of the ADA”).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”).
178. Id. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(a). In fact, the definition of a “public accommodation” explicitly includes an “insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” Id.
§ 12181(7)(F).
179. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.207 (2013).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (“No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place
of public accommodation.”).
181. See id. § 12131 (defining a “qualified individual” for Title II purposes
as “[a]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity”); see also
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 99 (“In the health care context, this means that a health care entity must modify its policies, practices,
and procedures when necessary to enable people with disabilities to gain full
and equal access to its services, unless a requested modification constitutes a
fundamental alteration of the health care service itself.”).
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dates that people with disabilities enjoy equal access to health
182
care. However, much like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA
has not had a meaningful impact on access to health care for
183
people with disabilities. The civil rights structure of those
laws offers an explanation as to why.
Civil rights statutes share certain characteristics with respect to their purpose, as well as the content of their protections. As discussed, antidiscrimination laws seek to eliminate
184
group subordination. Consequently, their protections forbid
covered entities from discriminating on the basis of a particular
185
trait. However, whether specific conduct rises to the level of
actionable discrimination is a question frequently left to judi186
cial interpretation. Because civil rights statutes prohibit discriminatory conduct—opposed to providing explicit substantive
entitlements—courts have been free to interpret the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA very narrowly in the context of health
care. Further, civil rights statutes’ emphasis on individualized
instances of discrimination and private enforcement renders
those laws ill-equipped for addressing health disparities occur187
ring at the population level.
Because of its inherent limitations, the civil rights paradigm has failed to achieve meaningful access to health services
in the three areas of health law discussed: (1) public health in182. See Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1071 ( “The ADA
requires equal access to health care.”).
183. Id. at 1065 (“Although the ADA establishes the necessary foundation
for ensuring equal and accessible care for people with disabilities, people with
disabilities continue to experience significant barriers to care, including basic
preventive health services.”); see also Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note
31, at 86–87 (“A frank assessment shows that, aside from its impact on the individual encounters between patient and provider, the ADA’s application has
[as of 2000] been neither forceful nor sweeping.”).
184. See supra note 42 for a discussion of an antisubordination orientation
for antidiscrimination law.
185. Protections framed as blanket prohibitions on the consideration of a
particular trait are arguably anticlassification, not antisubordination, in nature. However, even those protections may be in response to group subordination. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 9 (2003).
186. For example, in the instances described below, the Supreme Court
was deciding whether policies and practices that had a tangible negative impact on people with disabilities constituted “discrimination” for the purposes of
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See discussion infra notes 188–205 and
accompanying text.
187. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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surance and government benefits; (2) private insurance; and (3)
public health. I will discuss each in turn.
First, with regard to social-welfare programs, the courts
have been reluctant to apply civil rights legislation in a manner
that ensures health-care access for people with disabilities.
Even before the passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court severely limited the applicability of antidiscrimination-style legislation to public health-insurance programs, like Medicaid. In
the 1985 landmark case, Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme
Court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to a state’s
Medicaid rationing decision, regardless of its potentially dis188
parate impact. As of 1980, Tennessee’s Medicaid program
189
cost more than the state legislature chose to fund. Faced with
this budgeting dilemma, the state proposed limiting Medicaid
recipients to fourteen days of in-patient hospital care per
190
year. While neutral on its face, that restriction would likely
have impacted individuals with disabilities more severely, as
191
they tend to consume more health services. Consequently,
Tennessee Medicaid beneficiaries filed a class action lawsuit,
192
alleging the decision violated the Rehabilitation Act. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the state’s decision, holding
that limiting the number of covered hospital days did not eliminate “meaningful access” to the Medicaid program for people
193
with disabilities. The Court reasoned that because both recipients with and without disabilities received an identical benefit
(in this case fourteen days of in-patient care), each group en194
joyed the same access. Perhaps most importantly, the Court
construed the benefit at stake as a “package of health care ser195
vices,” not adequate, equitable, or accessible health care.
Thus, under Choate, public health-insurance providers do not
discriminate on the basis of disability, even when their deci-

188. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
189. Id. at 289.
190. The state had previously covered twenty days. Id.
191. Id. at 290. According to the evidence, 27.4% of people with disabilities
who received Medicaid used over fourteen days of in-patient hospital care,
compared with only 7.8% of recipients without disabilities. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 306–09. Bagenstos identifies Choate as the advent of the “access/content” distinction he explores in much of his work on disability rights
law. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 46–49.
194. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302.
195. Id. at 303.
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sions negatively impact people with disabilities, so long as they
196
provide identical benefits.
Further, courts have been likewise reluctant to enforce civil rights legislation with respect to private insurance. With its
focus on facilitating independence for people with disabilities,
the ADA can be understood as an effort to shift the provision of
care for the disability community from the public to the private
197
sector. However, as discussed, the legislation includes a safeharbor provision that allows insurers, health-care providers,
and other benefit administrators to engage in traditional risk
assessment and underwriting activities, as long as those activi198
ties have a sound actuarial basis. The ADA, therefore, does
not outlaw any of the traditional insurance practices that disadvantage people with disabilities, such as preexisting condition exclusions, caps on coverage, and health status-based rat199
ing. Interestingly, however, courts have not relied on the
safe-harbor provision when rejecting challenges to insurance
practices that disadvantage people with disabilities. For instance, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., two HIVpositive plaintiffs challenged their private insurer’s caps on
200
HIV-related coverage as a violation of Title III of the ADA. In
lieu of invoking the safe-harbor, the Seventh Circuit instead
upheld the caps as nondiscriminatory because the insurer offered the same products to all of its insureds, regardless of HIV
201
status. Thus, courts have relied on the content of the policy or
196. Scholars have challenged whether the access granted under Choate is
truly “meaningful” with respect to the varying needs of the disabled and nondisabled. See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate: “Meaningful Access” to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 451–52 (2008) (“A fourteen-day hospital stay
is ‘meaningful’ for those whose conditions can be adequately treated within a
fourteen-day period. For those whose conditions require more, such as patients
requiring high-dose chemotherapy plus stem cell rescue, fourteen days of hospitalization might as well be no benefit at all.”).
197. Parmet, supra note 96, at 340 (“The ADA can be seen not as the public
recognition of the needs of the disabled, but as a way of supporting the privatization of the disabled’s health care needs”).
198. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
199. Gostin, supra note 76, at 182 (“The ADA, therefore, does not restrict
an insurer, health care provider, or any entity that administers benefit plans
from carrying on its normal underwriting activities. This includes the use of
preexisting condition clauses in health insurance contracts, the placing of caps
or other limits on coverage for certain procedures or treatments, or the charging of a premium to persons with higher risks.”).
200. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
201. Id. at 558–62.
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benefit offered—not the relative utility of that policy or benefit
to the individual policy-holders or beneficiaries—when deciding
202
whether discrimination occurred.
Importantly, the courts have interpreted the Rehabilitation
Act and ADA to leave the patient-professional relationship
largely intact. In the leading case on the subject, the Second
Circuit held that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to
203
treatment decisions. Likewise, the ADA preserves a physician’s ability to make treatment and other decisions, such as
accepting or rejecting a patient, so long as she does not base
204
her decision on the patient’s disability.
Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority, further reiterated this point in a footnote in the 1999 Title II case, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring.
She opined:
We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the States a
‘standard of care’ for whatever medical services they render, or that
the ADA requires States to ‘provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities.’ We do hold, however, that States must adhere to the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the
205
services they in fact provide.

It has, therefore, been the position of the courts that civil rights
laws, like the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, do not ensure a
basic level of medical care or benefits for people with disabilities, but rather protect individuals with disabilities from being
treated differently than patients and beneficiaries without disabilities.
The ADA also has its limits in ensuring accessible medical
equipment. In the over two decades since Congress passed the
ADA, only a handful of lawsuits have challenged inaccessible

202. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 40–41 (explaining that “[w]ith only a few
exceptions, [courts] have not found it necessary to rely on the safe harbor provision” and have instead employed the “access/content” distinction “[s]o long as
the insurer offers people with disabilities the opportunity to purchase policies
on the same terms as everyone else, it has not denied them access to the benefit received by the nondisabled” even if the caps and exclusions are for specific
disabling conditions).
203. See United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157–61 (2d Cir. 1984).
204. See Gostin, supra note 76, at 179 (“The ADA does not guarantee access to health care but merely requires that the refusal to provide equal access
cannot be based on a person’s disability. A provider’s health care decision may
be based, in part, on cost. Providing health services of inferior quality or not
providing services at all because of a person’s inability to pay may be unethical, but it is not necessarily unlawful.”).
205. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999) (citation omitted).
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medical equipment as violations of the legislation. Of the four
private actions filed against health-care providers lacking ac207
cessible medical equipment, all four settled. Additionally, the
Department of Justice took part in several actions against
health-care providers for architectural barriers and inaccessible
208
medical equipment from 1994 to 2009. Despite this flurry of
activity, both private and public ADA litigation have failed to
increase the availability of accessible medical equipment to a
209
meaningful extent.
Thus, while the ADA indicates a strong ideological opposition to discriminating against individuals with disabilities in
health care, its practical effect on the health disparities experi210
enced by people with disabilities has been limited. The National Council on Disability has criticized the Department of
Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services for
failing to enforce both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA ag211
gressively in the context of health care. Because of this limited enforcement, civil rights laws are an ineffective means to
206. Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1067 tbl.1; see also id.
at 1067–69 (summarizing the private ADA actions against facilities with inaccessible medical equipment).
207. Id. at 1069.
208. Id. (“Between 1994 and September 2009, the Department was involved in fifty-five actions involving architectural barriers in a health care setting, and twelve actions involving inaccessible medical equipment . . . .”); see
also id. at 1070 tbl.2; id. at 1070–71 (describing the Department of Justice actions).
209. Id. at 1071. Elizabeth Pendo has attributed this result in part to a
lack of sufficiently detailed accessibility requirements for medical equipment.
Id. at 1065, 1071.
210. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1, 14 (“The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has had limited impact on how health care is
delivered for people with disabilities. Significant architectural and programmatic accessibility barriers still remain, and health care providers continue to
lack awareness about steps they are required to take to ensure that patients
with disabilities have access to appropriate, culturally competent care.”). These limitations have arguably been apparent since the law’s passing. See
Gostin, supra note 76, at 180 (“The ADA, then, in only a limited sense tears
down barriers to access to health services. It steadfastly refuses to allow a person to be turned away because of the provider’s fears and biases toward the
disability. However, it remains uncertain as to what extent the act will help to
ensure access to health care for those who arguably need it most.”).
211. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 14 (“The U.S.
Department of Justice and the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services are charged with responsibility for enforcing
the ADA and Section 504 in health care settings, yet they have taken on only a
relatively small number of cases involving disability discrimination in health
care, particularly when offices of health providers are involved.”).
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address the health disparities people with disabilities so often
212
face.
Finally, civil rights legislation provides an improper tool to
address disability-related inequities within public health. To
start, much of the disadvantage experienced by people with
disabilities in that context results not from overt discrimination, but rather from the failure to include the disability com213
munity as a relevant public health population. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, with their primary reliance on private
enforcement mechanisms, are geared more toward combating
individual instances of discrimination rather than systematic
214
exclusion at the population level. Moreover, courts have valued public health concerns over those of individuals with disa215
bilities, even in the face of civil rights challenges. This practice evolved into the doctrine known as the “direct threat”
defense, which allows covered entities (including employers and
commercial entities) to differentiate on the basis of disability in
the face of “significant risk to the health or safety of others that
216
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.” Thus,
covered entities are allowed to make decisions based on an individual’s disability when that decision implicates issues of
217
public health, such as the spread of communicable disease.
Importantly, the determination of what constitutes a “signifi218
cant risk” is influenced by public health officials.
Direct
212. Id. at 14–15 (“Without robust enforcement, the disability rights laws
are ineffective tools for challenging discriminatory conduct or care that people
with disabilities often report experiencing.”); see also id. at 18 (“Limited implementation of key disability rights laws by health care systems, managed
care organizations, and health care providers directly affects the quality of
care available to people with disabilities.”).
213. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
214. Michael Waterstone has discussed the limits of public and private enforcement mechanisms of Titles II and III of the ADA. See Michael
Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807 (2005).
215. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a hospital request to test an employee for HIV did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2006). While the statute explicitly protects decisions made to avoid or mitigate “significant risk to the health or safety of others,” judicial interpretation has extended the direct threat defense to apply to
significant risks to the disabled individual herself. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85–86 (2002).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
218. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 79–86 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, LAW
AND CONTRADICTIONS] (discussing the creation of the “direct threat” doctrine
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threat doctrine is justifiable on public health and safety
grounds, as long as the discriminatory behavior eliminates or
219
mitigates a potential public health concern.
While the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA sought to improve health-care access for people with disabilities, those statutes have not had a lasting impact. They have failed to address
the underlying structural barriers impeding access to health
care for people with disabilities, which are at the root of those
disparities. As discussed, this failure stems in significant part
from the structure of civil rights statutes.
C. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATE PARADIGMS
The health disparities discussed above affect not only an
individual’s wellness but also her ability to participate in other
aspects of daily living. When someone experiences poor health,
it impacts her independence, her ability to work, and her overall quality of life. As a result, health disparities are not restricted to issues of medical care: they may adversely touch
myriad facets of an individual’s existence.
Academics writing in the area of disability legal studies
have explored the limitations of civil rights legislation as a tool
for promoting equality, access, and integration for people with
disabilities. Samuel Bagenstos and Ani Satz have provided nuanced criticisms of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, both
generally and with respect to health care. In so doing, they
have urged disability rights advocates to move beyond the confines of the civil rights approach.
Bagenstos critiques the shortcomings of civil rights law in
the workplace. Since passing in 1990, the ADA has not sub220
stantially increased employment for people with disabilities.
Bagenstos attributes this failure, at least in part, to the unilateral preference for the antidiscrimination paradigm during the
221
first half of the disability rights movement. As he explains,
and the role of public health entities in determining “significant risk”); see also
Gostin, supra note 76, at 183 (noting the potential applicability of the ADA to
public health determinations of “significant risk”).
219. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 78–79
(discussing when it is permissible for entities to discriminate against disabilities when public health is at issue).
220. The rate of employment of people with disabilities since the passage of
the ADA may have even declined. See generally THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT
OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003).
221. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 23 (attributing the continued un- and
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civil rights legislation prohibits entities from discriminating on
the basis of a protected trait, in the case of the ADA, disabil222
ity.
However, individuals with disabilities encounter any
number of structural barriers—such as an inability to access
223
care and other assistive services—in their day-to-day lives.
These impediments prevent people with disabilities from applying for jobs, before they even have the opportunity to face dis224
crimination by their actual or potential employers. In short,
antidiscrimination requirements that outlaw discrimination on
the basis of disability may ultimately fail to address the underlying structural barriers. Thus, as a civil rights statute, the
ADA is poorly suited to attacking these significant root caus225
es. Bagenstos, therefore, maintains that the future of disability law might in fact lie in social welfare legislation such as
226
Medicaid and Medicare, not antidiscrimination protections.
Moreover, many of the structural barriers to employment
faced by people with disabilities relate directly to health-care

under-employment of people with disabilities post-ADA to “the inherently limited nature of antidiscrimination requirements”).
222. Id. (“Antidiscrimination requirements can prohibit employers from
discriminating against qualified people with disabilities who apply for jobs
. . . .”); see also id. at 51 (“In the dominant conception, antidiscrimination requirements provide a remedy for the defendant’s own wrongful conduct rather
than for the defendant’s failure to redress a broader societal wrong.”).
223. Id. at 25–34 (describing the structural barriers to employment faced
by people with disabilities).
224. Id. at 25 (“[M]any individuals with disabilities face significant barriers
to employment that operate well before they are ever in a position to be discriminated against by an employer.”).
225. See, e.g., id. at 23 (describing the “deep-rooted structural barriers” facing people with disabilities as the source of inequality and proposing that
“[a]ntidiscrimination laws like the ADA are a singularly ineffective means of
eliminating such structural barriers”); see also id. at 54 (“People with disabilities will not move into the workforce in more significant numbers unless the
law addresses deep-rooted barriers to employment such as the unavailability
of personal-assistance services, assistive technology, and accessible transportation, as well as the current structure of our health care system.”).
Although Bagenstos notes that the accommodation requirement of the
ADA may seem to mandate some of the positive conduct necessary to eliminate structural barriers, he proposes that a restrictive interpretation of that
requirement has rendered it more or less into a “classic” antidiscrimination
mandate, requiring that covered entities only be responsible for their own individualized exclusionary actions. Id. at 24; see also id. at 42–50 (describing
how courts’ interpretations of the “‘job-related’ rule” and the “access/content
distinction” have effectively transformed accommodation into antidiscrimination).
226. See generally id.
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access generally and health insurance specifically.
Consequently, Bagenstos dubs the lack of effective access to health
insurance “the most significant obstacle to entering the work228
force that people with disabilities collectively face.” He attributes the centrality of health insurance to the traditionally
medicalized understanding of “disability” and its related services, as well the disability community’s increased need for
229
health services. Bagenstos also asserts that because private
health insurance fails to cover needed services and the publicbenefits systems require beneficiaries be incapable of working,
the traditional structure of American health insurance creates
230
disincentives for re-entering the workforce.
Given the ADA’s limited impact on the employment of people with disabilities and its failure to address numerous structural barriers that continue to impede access, Bagenstos has
pushed disability rights advocates to look beyond the ADA, and
231
the civil rights paradigm generally. In particular, he identifies social welfare law as a possible vehicle for disability advocacy, despite the disability rights movement’s previous rejec227. Id. at 26–34 (discussing the barriers to disabled people created by the
structure of public and private health insurance).
228. Id. at 6.
229. Id. at 26–27 (“But far and away the most significant barrier to employment for people with disabilities is the current structure of our health insurance system. For two major reasons, health insurance is a matter of especial importance for those who have disabilities. First, because our society’s
response to disability has historically been so heavily medicalized, many of the
services people with disabilities need for independence and labor force participation—personal assistance and assistive technology being the most obvious—
are typically regarded as ‘medical’ services for which the health insurance system is responsible. Second, even without considering those services (which
might more appropriately be provided in a nonmedical context), it is nonetheless true that people with disabilities, on average, have greater health needs
than do those without disabilities.”).
230. Id. at 27 (“In its current form, our health insurance system affirmatively disserves the interest of people with disabilities in moving into the
workforce. The problem is not that people with disabilities are disproportionately uninsured; they are not. The problem is that private insurance—on
which most nondisabled people rely for their health needs—fails to cover the
services people with disabilities most need for independence and health. And
public insurance is saddled with requirements that lock people with disabilities out of the workforce.”).
231. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 25 (“[A]ctivists must look past the
ADA if they are to attack structural employment barriers effectively.”). He,
however, does not suggest they abandon the civil rights paradigm entirely. See
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 11 (“Disability
rights activists must not abandon the ADA model. They must build on it and,
indeed, go beyond it.”).
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232

tion of that legislative model. Thus, while Bagenstos focuses
his critique of the civil rights paradigm on its failures in the
employment context, his analysis also pertains to issues of
health-care access and delivery.
Ani Satz also criticizes the limitations of antidiscrimination law. She has identified what she calls “fragmentation”
233
within disability rights law. Satz defines fragmentation as
“treating vulnerabilities associated with impairments as if they
arise in discrete environments, such as the workplace or par234
ticular places of public accommodation.” Fragmentation takes
place when the law fails to reflect a person’s actual, lived expe235
rience accurately. According to Satz, the “targeted legal approach,” which restricts its protections to certain situational
contexts, such as employment, transportation or public accom236
237
modation, “fragments the human experience.”
The resulting legal protections are disjointed, at once implying that impaired individuals only experience disability in
certain situations and failing to recognize humanity’s universal
238
state of vulnerability. By carving up people’s lives into dis232. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 144–
45 (arguing that social welfare programs targeted to people with disabilities
would be stronger politics); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 74 (“Health
policy seems an extremely promising area in which to take a universalist approach. Until the 1990s, American disability rights activists were quite averse
to urging a broadening of guaranteed health coverage. The movement had
‘worked so hard for so long to separate the issues of health and disability’ that
demands for broader health coverage would seem to ‘resurrect[] harmful stereotypes.’ . . . . [A] universal health care system . . . would not send the message that people with disabilities are uniquely in need of caretaking; it would
send the message that we all need insurance against contingencies in life.”).
233. See Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, at 541 (presenting a new critique to the antidiscrimination
approach to disability discrimination based on “fragmenting disability protection”).
234. Id.
235. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 281.
236. Cf. id. at 279 (“Legal protections start and stop in various places within the public realm and may not afford the continuity necessary for meaningful civic or social participation.”).
237. Id. at 278 (“The major weakness of this targeted legal approach is that
individuals’ experiences and needs are not viewed holistically across civic and
social realms, but in fragments defined by certain legally protected contexts.
By varying protection based on context, the law fragments the human experience.”).
238. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination,
supra note 5, at 541 (“Generally speaking, [fragmentation] results in a patchwork of protections that do not coalesce to allow meaningful social participation. More specifically, viewing vulnerabilities as situational creates the false
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crete legally protected spheres, existing laws stop and start in a
way that denies the interconnectedness of daily living. Thus,
current protections may mandate access to a building but not
239
necessarily to the services provided within. Likewise, a law
may prohibit an employer from discriminating against a potential employee on the basis of her disability yet remain silent
with regard to providing the home-health aide necessary to as240
sist her in getting ready for work. Further, restricting legal
protections to specific circumstances focuses on the context of
the discrimination or inequality, drawing attention away from
241
the structural inequalities that underlie it.
In response to fragmentation, Satz calls for a blending of
legal protections related to disability through a lens of “univer242
sal vulnerability.” She explains that vulnerability to illness
and the resulting need for health care is not an issue of disability rights, but rather an essential aspect of the human condi243
tion. Because universal health care serves the greater good,
244
not just those with a heightened need for care,
everyone
perception that individuals with significant impairments are not disabled in
some environments. In addition, a situational approach to vulnerability disregards the benefits of conceptualizing vulnerability as universal for disabled
and nondisabled individuals alike.”).
239. Id. at 544 (“As a result of laws treating vulnerability as arising in isolated transactions rather than as a part of an integrated experience, protections for disabled individuals are often interrupted, denying meaningful social
participation. Someone may be able to enter a building but not partake in the
services offered, for example.”).
240. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 279 (“Thus, a
fragmented approach to law fails to recognize or appreciate that barriers arising in an environment the law does not address, such as the home, may impact
participation in other environments where the law does provide protections,
such as the workplace.”).
241. See Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, at 545 (“Viewing the vulnerabilities associated with disability as situational in this way also masks structural inequalities. Disability
protections that target particular aspects of a disabled individual’s life, such
as fulfilling the functions of her job or entering an insurance office, shift legal
focus away from inequalities like wage disparities and health care policies
that disfavor mental disability.”).
242. See id. at 522 (arguing that in order to reform disability law the blending of civil rights and social welfare models is required).
243. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing Satz’s work on
the universal nature of illness).
244. See Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, at 561 (“Viewing illness as universal and constant vulnerability contributes a new perspective on the need for universal health care. Restructuring current health care institutions to support health care as a public
good may be the best way to address vulnerability to illness and the vulnera-
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stands to gain from access to expansive and affordable health
245
care. Thus, according to Satz, issues of health-care access
must be addressed outside of the civil rights paradigm, which
limits its protections to particular groups or traits in specific
246
contexts. Given her universalist orientation, she is critical of
scholarly approaches that confine their analysis to the need for
health law protections—particularly the provision of benefits—
247
specifically for people with disabilities.
Both Bagenstos and Satz have explored the deficiencies of
the civil rights paradigm, albeit in different contexts.
Bagenstos analyzes how antidiscrimination law has failed to
have a meaningful impact on employment for people with disabilities because of its inability to target the structural barriers
248
underlying their access to work. Satz focuses her critique on
how legal protections stop and start in particular protected
spheres, thereby undermining the continuity of an individual’s
249
actual lived experience.
Thus, they have urged disability
rights advocates to look beyond the civil rights model to promote equality, access, and integration for people with disabilities.
***
While disability discrimination is undoubtedly a social issue, certain individuals with disabilities experience greater
250
health-care needs. Although civil rights legislation seeks to
bilities that result from illness.”).
245. Id. at 531 (“[A]rguments may be made in the health care context, as
everyone benefits from broad, affordable coverage, given universal vulnerability to illness and other impairments requiring medical attention.”).
246. See id. at 552.
247. Id. at 522 (“[F]ocusing on the issue of lack of material supports
. . . both understates and overstates the problem. It overstates it in the sense
that some of the pressing issues facing disabled persons—such as difficulty in
qualifying for the protected class or receiving a preferred accommodation, remains tied to protected class status. These issues must be addressed within
the civil rights framework. It understates matters in the sense that access to
some material supports, such as health care, is not a disability discrimination
issue but one of general social welfare.”).
248. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 25 (asserting that structural employment barriers can be effectively attacked, if activists look past the ADA).
249. See Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 5, at 279 (asserting
that legal protection may not be afforded for civil or social participation because legal protection is focused within the public sphere).
250. See Crossley, Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 53 (noting that people with disabilities have extensive health care needs as a result of their disa-

2014

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1963

promote equality, access, and integration, the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA have failed to eliminate the health disparities
251
experienced by the disability community. People with disabilities still face significant barriers to access and do not enjoy
252
health outcomes on par with their non-disabled counterparts.
Thus, those statutes have not accomplished their civil rights
goals in the context of health care. These failures can in part be
attributed to certain fundamental limitations of the civil rights
253
model. Civil rights legislation prohibits discriminatory conduct but often leaves the bounds of its protection up to judicial
interpretation. Courts have interpreted the meaning of discrimination very narrowly when it comes to issues of health,
demonstrating a deference to state programs, insurers, indi254
vidual physicians, and public health officials. Health law may
thus serve as an alternate tool to further disability rights in the
context of health care.
III. HEALTH-CARE REFORM AS DISABILITY RIGHTS
LEGISLATION
255

On its face, the ACA is a health law. Congress designed
the statute to achieve explicitly health-related objectives: to
improve access to health care and to promote the wellness of
Americans. It contains provisions that fall into each of the substantive categories of health law previously discussed:
(1) public health insurance and government benefits; (2) private health insurance law; and (3) public health law. Yet despite its health law purpose and content, the ACA has markedly civil rights results in terms of its potential effect on people
with disabilities.

bility).
251. See generally Waterstone, supra note 214 (summarizing the reasons
that ADA failed to eliminate health disparities for people with disabilities).
252. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 1 (asserting that disabled persons experience more significant barriers compared to nondisabled
persons).
253. See Crossley, Becoming Visibility, supra note 31, at 88–89 (asserting
that ADA’s failure to improve health-care access to disabled persons was attributed to ADA being a civil rights statute).
254. See id. at 53 (asserting that courts took a “hands-off approach to
health care issues”).
255. The ACA does contain some antidiscrimination-style provisions, much
like its predecessor HIPAA. However, the substance of the statute is entirely
health-related. See generally ACA §§ 2001–202, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
271 (2010).
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This Part argues that health-care reform could succeed
where antidiscrimination laws have failed, demonstrating that
health law can perform the work of civil rights. The ACA,
therefore, bridges the gap between the health law and civil
rights law paradigms. It harnesses health law protections to facilitate the civil rights outcomes of equality, access, and integration in the context of health care. By taking an active role in
the reform, disability rights advocates recognized the potentially transformative power of the ACA on disability rights. This
Part begins by recounting how members of the disability rights
movement rallied to reform health care. It then performs a
close reading of portions of the statute that benefit individuals
with disabilities. Finally, the Article ends by analyzing what
champions of disability—and other civil—rights can learn from
health-care reform, concluding that advocates should adopt an
integrated legal approach to address disparities and to achieve
access.
A. HEALTH-CARE REFORM AS A DISABILITY RIGHTS ISSUE
Despite the disability rights movement’s initial discomfort
with health law discussed in Part I, advocacy organizations
recognized the shortcomings of the civil rights approach in targeting the health disparities faced by people with disabilities
and embraced health-care reform as a necessary tool to promote disability rights. During the health-care reform debate,
proponents of disability rights pushed Congress to consider the
health disparities and wellness concerns faced by the disability
256
community.
Even before the 2010 health-care reform, advocates
acknowledged health law as a means for promoting disability
rights. As early as 1994 President Bill Clinton identified the
significant role health-care reform could play for people with
257
disabilities.
He explained that reforming the American
258
health-care system would “finish what the ADA started.”
256. UNITED SPINAL ASS’N & THE NAT’L SPINAL CORD INJURY ASS’N
(NSCIA), IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE REFORM ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 1
(2010) [hereinafter USA & NSCIA] (“The disability community has worked together tirelessly for more than a year to achieve health care reform.”); Joe
Caldwell, Implications of Health Care Reform for Individuals with Disabilities,
48 INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 216, 216 (2010) (“The disability community
actively engaged in the legislative process and shaped the final outcome.”).
257. See SWITZER, supra note 77, at 115 (quoting Clinton as saying that
reforming health care “would finish the business of the ADA”).
258. Id.
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President Clinton, therefore, believed that the ADA alone
would not achieve the degree of equality, integration, and access that the disability rights movement desired. Changing the
structure and delivery of health care was also necessary.
In the years following the ADA, proponents of disability
rights demonstrated a renewed interest in health law as tool
259
for their cause. In addition to filing civil rights suits, advocates have also lobbied for legislative change in the area of
260
health care. For example, in the late 2000s, the Promoting
Wellness for Individuals with Disabilities Act garnered support
261
from members of Congress. Introduced in both the House and
the Senate in 2006 and again in the House in 2009, the bill
would have set standards for accessible medical equipment,
created grant programs to promote wellness for people with
disabilities, and instituted training programs for improving the
262
disability competency of health-care professionals. The law,
263
264
however, never passed. All three bills died in committee.
259. Ten years before Congress passed the ACA, Mary Crossley suggested
that reforming health care could fill the gaps left by the ADA. See Crossley,
Becoming Visible, supra note 31, at 88–89 (“[I]t is not fair to judge the ADA as
a failure in the realm of health care, for the ADA is a civil rights statute, not a
health-care reform statute. Although persons with disabilities may face barriers to accessing health care to a greater extent than the general population,
the barriers posed by lack of insurance, underinsurance, and administrative
constraints on accessing care are certainly not unique to persons with disabilities. Consequently, health care reform that addresses these barriers may play
a greater role in improving the health care received by people with disabilities
than the ADA ever can.”). She, therefore, encouraged disability rights advocates to pursue health-care reform. See id. at 89. More recently, Elizabeth
Pendo has maintained that the ACA provides an alternate avenue to address
barriers to health-care access that people with disabilities experience, particularly with respect to medical equipment. See Pendo, supra note 150, at 1073
(stating that the ACA “offers a new approach to these pervasive barriers”); id.
at 1083 (proposing that “health care reform offers a new and complementary
approach” for eliminating access barriers for people with disabilities).
260. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 55 (“[B]oth the litigation dockets and legislative priorities of disability rights organizations have increasingly focused on
social welfare rather than antidiscrimination laws. Disability rights advocates
now frequently bring cases under social welfare law like Medicaid Act as well
as under antidiscrimination laws like the ADA, and they lobby for changes in
public health-insurance programs that would enhance the integration and
employability of people with disabilities. To a far greater extent than commentators have appreciated, the disability rights movement has turned (back) to a
social welfare approach to disability law.”).
261. Promoting Wellness for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2006, S.
3717, 109th Cong. (2006).
262. Id.; H.R. 1938 111th Cong. (2009); see also Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1072–73 (discussing the Promoting Wellness for Individuals with Disabilities Act). The bill would have amended the Rehabilitation
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Disability rights advocates have also actively lobbied for
legislation to expand Medicaid and Medicare. For example, in
1999, they played a critical role in passing the Ticket to Work
265
and Work Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA). The statute extends Medicare benefits for over eight years after a previously eligible person with a disability re-enters the work266
force. Additionally, it expedites the process for reinstating the
benefits of former recipients of Medicaid or Medicare, who re267
turned to work, but again find themselves “disabled.”
More recently, in its 2009 report on the state of health for
people with disabilities, the National Council on Disability explained that health legislation was essential to address many of
the barriers that patients with disabilities face in obtaining
268
health care. Thus, the Council urged reformers to consider
the needs of the disability community when revamping the
269
health-care system. It proposed that Congress expand both
public and private health insurance coverage to facilitate better
access to care, as well as improve the availability of prescrip270
tion drugs, accessible medical equipment, and assistive aids.
Act to require the Access Board to create and review accessibility standards
for medical equipment, amended the Public Health Service Act to allow for the
creation of relevant grant programs, and provided training programs. See id.
at 1072–73.
263. See Pendo, supra note 150, at 1073 (stating that the Promoting Wellness for Individuals with Disabilities Act was introduced in 2006 and 2009,
but was not enacted).
264. Id.
265. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 140 (explaining the effects of TWWIIA and the role of people with disabilities in its
passage).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (Supp. IV 2010); see also BAGENSTOS, LAW AND
CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 140.
267. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(i), 1383(p) (Supp. IV 2010); see also BAGENSTOS, LAW
AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 140.
268. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 28, at 16 (“Legislation will
be required to address some of the key gaps and barriers to health care that
affect people with disabilities, including access to wellness and prevention services, health and health disparities research, development of care models built
on principles of patient-centered care, and professional training.”).
269. Id. at 16 (“Long-term health care reform must include the voices of
people with disabilities, not only to advocate for improved health care insurance coverage, eligibility, and core benefits, but also to resolve issues of access
to critical accommodations that ensure that health care is effective, such as
payment coverage for sign language interpreters and requirements that providers demonstrate disability cultural competency.”).
270. Id. at 96 (“Congress should ensure that reform of the health care system in the United States responds to the basic needs of people with disabilities
by making certain that health care coverage is available and affordable to all
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This strong support for health legislation—particularly for
measures expanding Medicaid—exhibited by disability rights
advocates indicates their acknowledgement that antidiscrimination law by itself will not achieve the level of integration they
271
seek.
These efforts culminated in the context of health-care reform. Disability rights advocates organized, formed coalitions,
and lobbied for changes to the health-care system that would
improve the health disparities people with disabilities endure.
One especially powerful organization was the Consortium for
272
Citizens with Disabilities. Over one hundred national disabil273
ity rights organizations came together to form that coalition.
The Consortium exhorted reformers to view the proposed legislation through what one advocate called the “universal prism of
274
disability.” Understanding the needs of the disability community could inform the provision of health care for the general
population. In other words, as Mary Andrus, Co-Chair of the
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities Health Care Task
Force, testified before Congress, “as you look at proposals for
healthcare reform, look at them through the experience of a
person with a disability and if the proposal meets those needs,
it’s highly likely to meet the needs of the rest of the popula275
tion.” The CCD and its membership organizations worked ac276
tively to urge Congress to reform health care.
people with disabilities without preexisting condition limitations. Benefits
made available through either private or public coverage, or a combination,
must include access to appropriate prescription medications, specialty care,
care coordination, durable medical equipment and assistive devices, and longterm care services. Any coinsurance payments must be affordable, and annual
or lifetime limits on these key benefits must not be permitted.”).
271. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 69–70 (“[T]he fact that disability rights
activists have placed such a high priority on the enactment of legislation expanding the Medicaid program is itself telling. It reflects a recognition by disability rights activists that the ADA alone is not sufficient to achieve community integration for people with disabilities. Social welfare law remains
important as well.”).
272. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 218.
273. Id. For a list of member organizations, see CDC MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY,
http://www.c-c-d.org/members/CCD_Membership_Directory_2011.pdf
(last updated Aug. 8, 2011).
274. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 218–19.
275. Healthcare Reform Roundtable (Part I): Hearing of the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 32 (2009) (statement of Mary
Andrus).
276. See Letter from the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities to the
U.S. Congress (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.aucd.org/docs/CCD%
20sign-on%20ltr%20health%20care%20reform%20now%201-28-10.pdf
(pre-
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In addition to their participation through the CCD, national disability advocacy organizations also launched their own initiatives in favor of health-care reform. For example, the National Multiple Sclerosis Society adopted a set of National
Health Care Reform Principles, designed to ensure that legislative change would address the needs and concerns of the Multi277
ple Sclerosis (MS) community. The organization also encouraged members to sign and distribute a petition in favor of
278
health-care reform. Likewise, United Cerebral Palsy posted
action alerts advising its membership to contact their Senators
regarding the legislation’s coverage of long-term care supports
279
and services.
State disability advocacy organizations also rallied in support of reforming health care. In California, the Disability
Health Coalition issued a report analyzing health-care reform
and making recommendations with regard to its effect on peo280
ple with disabilities and endorsed a series of principles de281
signed to guide lawmakers.
Similarly, the Missouri-based
Disability Coalition on Healthcare Reform drafted principles,
signed by more than sixty organizations, sent to key members
282
of the Senate.
senting the signatures of member organizations). For a list of the CCD Health
Task Force’s activities, see CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES,
HEALTH TASK FORCE, http://www.c-c-d.org/task_forces/health/tf-health.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
277. See NATIONAL MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS SOCIETY: NATION HEALTH CARE
REFORM PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.nationalmssociety.org/
government-affairs-and-advocacy/position-papers--policies/index.aspx (ensuring “that programs and activities that benefit individuals living with MS and
their families receive the funding they deserve”).
278. Id. (providing information on how one’s Senators or Representatives
can join Congressional Multiple Sclerosis Caucus).
279. See, e.g., Action Alerts and Updates, UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY, http://
ucp.org/public-policy/action-alerts-updates (last visited Apr. 22, 2013) (providing an example an Action Alerts and Updates).
280. DISABILITY HEALTH COALITION: HEALTH CARE REFORM ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.google.com (search “analysis and recommendations” and “health care reform” and disability; then click the hyperlink “Ensure Greater Accessibility for People with Disabilities in Health”).
281. Health Care Reform Principles, DISABILITY HEALTH COALITION (June
1, 2007), http://dredf.org/healthcare/healthcare.shtml (scroll down to click hyperlink “Read the California Health Coalition Health Care Reform Principles”).
282. Letter from the Disability Coalition on Healthcare Reform et al., to
Max Baucus and Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senators. (June 2, 2009), available at
http://www.healthpolicyproject.org/Publications_files/USHARE/Medicaidprinci
plesstatesignonletter.pdf.
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On top of cross-disability coalition building, champions of
disability rights also joined forces with other kinds of advocacy
groups. Working together, almost three hundred disability
rights, faith-based, and elder rights organizations mounted an
aggressive campaign of grass-roots activism—including phonecalls, emails, and office visits—to urge members of Congress to
283
include long-term care in the reform. These efforts were remarkable not only for their impact but also for their effect on
future advocacy. Despite certain key shared interests, proponents of disability rights and proponents of aging rights have
284
historically operated separately. Health-care reform represents perhaps the first instance in which these two communi285
ties have worked in tandem toward a common goal. Supporting health-care reform not only aligned people with differing
kinds of disabilities but also coalesced the disability community
286
and advocates for other groups to form a powerful lobby. Disabilities rights advocates may have thus laid the foundation for
287
important alliances going forward.
Members of Congress acknowledged these substantial efforts. In describing the groundswell of support for health-care
reform, Representative Carolyn Kilpatrick cited the work of
numerous advocacy organizations, including those representing
the disability community: “[t]he groups expressing their support include a broad range, including groups representing doctors, seniors, small business, youth, women, persons with disa288
bilities, consumers and patients.” Senator Harry Reid put a
283. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 219 (“Over 275 national aging, disability,
and faith-based organizations coordinated an advocacy campaign on long-term
services and supports, generating literally thousands of calls, e-mails, faxes,
and visits to Congressional offices—a force that could not have been mounted
alone and one that could not be ignored.”).
284. Id. (noting that the two communities “traditionally worked in silos”).
285. Id. (describing the collaboration as “unprecedented”).
286. See id. (“Over 100 cross-disability organization joined together to urge
Congress to address health disabilities and wellness for individuals with disabilities.”).
287. Id. (describing the collaboration between the disability rights and aging rights communities as “perhaps the most significant outcome of health reform”). This new alliance may well prove useful in future efforts to protect disability rights. See id. (“Although the rhetoric of health care reform in the
popular media focused on the politics of division, there are powerful lessons to
be learned in the disability community about working together to effect
change, lessons we must carry forward as we move forward to implementation
and ‘the work begins anew.’”).
288. 155 CONG. REC. H12,893 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Kilpatrick) (emphasis added).
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human face on the need for reform, by reading several personal
letters from individuals with disabilities describing the barriers
289
they faced obtaining affordable health care. Lastly, perhaps
echoing President Clinton’s remarks in the mid-nineties, Senator Tom Harkin described the proposed increase to state Medicaid funding for deinstitutionalizing people with disabilities as
“a dream of the disability community since we passed the
290
Americans With Disability Act [sic] in 1990.”
As stated, the ACA has a decidedly health law purpose and
structure. However, given the involvement of disability rights
advocates in the push for reform, it is not surprising that the
resulting legislation contains many provisions that will both
291
explicitly and implicitly benefit the disability community. Insofar as health-care reform facilitates equality, access, and integration for people with disabilities, the ACA can be understood as a disability rights law.
B. IMPACT OF THE ACA ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Health-care reform will benefit the disability community in
292
a number of a ways. In particular, people with disabilities
will enjoy expanded access to public and private healthinsurance coverage and recognition as a health disparities population. Thus, while the ACA is decidedly a health law in terms
of its purpose and content, by promoting access, integration,
and equality in health-care provision for people with disabilities, it will have a civil rights effect. This Article focuses on the
ACA’s positive impact for people with disabilities in the context
of the three substantive areas of health law described in Parts I
and II: (1) public health insurance and government benefits;
(2) private health insurance; and (3) public health, specifically
health disparities research.

289. 155 CONG. REC. S13,645 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Reid) (drawing from several letters from constituents).
290. 155 CONG. REC. S13,848, (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Harkin) (describing the six percent increase to state Medicaid funding for enacting legislation implementing the integration mandate articulated in
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)).
291. See Caldwell, supra note 256, at 216 (stating that the lobbying efforts
of the disability community shaped the legislation).
292. See, e.g., id. at 216–18 (describing the positive impact of the ACA on
individuals with disabilities). See generally USA & NSCIA, supra note 256.
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1. Public Benefits and the ACA
The ACA contains several provisions designed to expand
and improve the public benefits system. These changes will
benefit individuals with disabilities given their reliance on
293
Medicaid and Medicare for health-insurance coverage. While
disability rights advocates successfully pushed to expand Medi294
care and Medicaid in the late 1990s, those changes failed to
eliminate significant shortcomings, mainly Medicare’s limited
eligibility for non-elderly individuals and its lack of adequate
295
coverage for assistive devices. The ACA addresses some of
these deficiencies. For example, the legislation expands the
Medicaid program. As written, the ACA would extend Medicaid
eligibility to anyone under 65 with an income at or below 133%
296
of the Federal Poverty Level, effective January 2014. States
could receive the additional funding provided under the statute
297
early by extending their coverage immediately. However, if a
state did not expand its Medicaid program by the deadline, it
298
would lose the entirety of its Medicaid funding.
The broadening of Medicaid came under attack during
2012. In his plurality opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts analyzed
the constitutionality of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provi299
sions. He—along with Justices Breyer and Kagan—concluded
that the severity of the accompanying penalty rose to the level
of coercion, thereby exceeding Congress’s authority under the
300
Spending Clause. Instead, the plurality decided that, while
Congress could withhold additional funding for a state’s failure
293. See supra text accompanying note 35 (describing the reliance of people
with disabilities on public insurance).
294. See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
295. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 141 (“Medicare was designed for a nonworking elderly population and does not serve the
interest of the people with disabilities in community integration and to the labor market.”).
296. ACA §§ 2001–202, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 271 (2010); see also
USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 5.
297. ACA §§ 2001–202; see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 5
298. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Supp. V 2011) (explaining that if a state does not
comply with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions “further payments will
not be made to the State”).
299. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012)
(plurality opinion).
300. Id. at 2607 (stating that Congress is not free to penalize states that
choose not to partake in the new program by taking away existing Medicaid
funding).
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to comply with the Medicaid expansion, it was unconstitutional
301
Thus, following the ruling,
to threaten existing funding.
states may choose whether to expand their Medicaid programs
without jeopardizing the funds they received prior to the ACA.
Yet even if a majority of states adopt the ACA’s expansion
of Medicaid, merely increasing coverage for public benefits may
302
not be enough to have a lasting impact. Both Medicaid and
Medicare have historically failed to provide adequate benefits
303
for at-home assistance for individuals with disabilities. As a
result, disability rights advocates also lobbied for—and won—
better coverage for on-going, at-home health services during
the health-care reform debate.
The statute improves services and supports for people re304
quiring long-term care. The ACA strengthens the Money Follows the Person (MFP) Program to facilitate transitioning indi305
viduals from institutions to community placements. It also
creates the Community First Choice (CFC) Option, designed to
support state Medicaid plans in offering community-based care
306
in conjunction with nursing homes and institutions. CFC

301. Id.
302. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 141–
42 (arguing that expanded coverage is not sufficient to address disparities adequately); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 61–62 (explaining that one type
of limitation is the institutionalization of Medicaid).
303. See BAGENSTOS, LAW AND CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 218, at 141–
42 (describing the need for at-home services and the proposed Medicaid Community-Based Attendant Services and Supports Act); see also Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 68.
304. USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 4 (describing provisions designed to
expand support for at-home and community-based services); Caldwell, supra
note 256, at 217 (“The healthcare legislation contains a robust package of reforms on long-term services and supports, including the Community Living
Assistance Services (CLASS) Act and improvements in Medicaid.”).
305. ACA § 2403, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 304 (2010) (amending Sections 6071(b) and 6071(h) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp. V 2011)). The ACA extends the program through 2016,
supports its continuation in twenty-nine states, adds thirteen new states, and
expands eligibility. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Affordable
Care Act Supports States in Strengthening Community Living (Feb. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110222b.html; see
also Money Follows the Person, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/
Medicaid-CHIP-program-Information/By-Topics/Long-Term-Services-and
-Support/Balancing/Money-Follows-the-Person.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2013).
306. ACA § 2401.
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mandates that states provide recipients with assistance for dai307
ly living, not just those activities related to health.
It is also worth noting that the legislation, as passed, included the much-contested Community Living Assistance Ser308
vices and Supports program (CLASS Act). The CLASS Act
would have established a voluntary, national insurance program designed to provide affordable community living services.
The program, which would have applied to individuals in need
309
of on-going care and support, was fraught with controversy.
On February 1, 2012, the House voted to repeal the CLASS
310
Act. Although the Obama administration did not support the
legislative repeal, it had already deemed the program unwork311
able as of October 2011.
Advocates for people with disabilities hope that, taken en
masse, these changes to public health insurance will improve
health-care delivery for the disability community, as well as the
312
American population as a whole.
Health-care reform expands public health insurance both
in terms of the individuals who are eligible and the types of
services it covers. As noted, people with disabilities may require more health services but have habitually encountered
barriers to access, leading to widespread health disparities.
Certain individuals with disabilities did not qualify for public
benefits, and those that did may still have been unable to obtain needed care because of restrictions on coverage. However,
by increasing eligibility and bolstering coverage, the ACA’s
changes to public health insurance hold the promise to elimi307. Id.
308. See Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS)
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300ll (Supp. V 2011).
309. A determination by a “licensed health care practitioner” that an individual has a “functional limitation,” as defined by the statute, “expected to last
for a continuous period of more than 90 days” triggers benefits under the
CLASS Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300ll-2(a)(1)(C).
310. Paige Winfield Cunningham, House Votes to Repeal Part of Health
Care Law, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, at A4.
311. Id.; see also N.C. Aizenman, Long-Term Care Program Scrapped,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2011, at A1.
312. See Caldwell, supra note 256, at 219 (explaining that “the disability
community challenged the very concept of health, moving the discussion beyond the narrow confines of acute care to a more inclusive framework of functioning, well being, and community participation”). Absent the efforts of disability rights advocates, the long-term care provisions would not have been
included. Id. (noting that “long-term services and supports, which were absolutely nowhere on the initial policy agenda, are included in the final legislation”).
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nate at least some barriers previously experienced by people
with disabilities and, consequently, to reduce existing health
disparities. Thus, while these provisions fall under the health
law umbrella substantively, insofar as they promote access, integration, and equality for people with disabilities, they will
make a civil rights law impact.
2. Private Health Insurance and the ACA
Similarly, several modifications to the private healthinsurance system will positively affect people with disabilities.
The legislation does away with a number of health-insurance
practices that have disproportionately disadvantaged individuals with disabilities. Effective immediately, health insurers can
313
no longer impose lifetime caps on benefits. In 2014, annual
caps will be likewise prohibited; however, in the meantime, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services can choose to restrict
314
annual caps. The caps on lifetime and annual limits are significant for people with disabilities because of their increased
315
need for health services.
The ACA also restricts decisions related to eligibility and
underwriting decisions. The new law immediately creates a
316
“pre-existing condition insurance plan” and, when it takes
full effect, will eliminate preexisting condition exclusions in
317
both group and individual coverage. Further, the law prohibits discrimination in underwriting; by 2014, group and individual insurers can no longer use health status when making eli318
gibility decisions.
Finally, the legislation will prevent insurers in the individual and small group markets (as well as the large-group insurers participating in the exchanges) from relying on health

313. ACA § 1001, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 130 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (Supp. V 2011)); see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at
2.
314. ACA § 1001; see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 2.
315. See Caldwell, supra note 256, at 216.
316. ACA § 1101 (instituting a coverage option for individuals who have
been denied insurance because of a preexisting condition); see also Pre-existing
Condition Insurance Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://pcip.gov/About_PCIP
.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
317. ACA § 1201 (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not impose any preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such plan or coverage.”).
318. Id.
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status when setting rates. As of 2014, the relevant health insurers must rely on the following four factors: (1) individual vs.
family coverage; (2) geographical location (community rating);
320
(3) age; and (4) tobacco use. Eliminating caps on coverage and
the consideration of health-related factors in underwriting and
rating decisions will have a positive impact on individuals with
disabilities. Again, the effect of these changes can be understood in civil rights terms because they eliminate policies and
practices that have disadvantaged people with disabilities. Doing away with those impediments will allow people with disabilities to obtain needed health care more readily, leading to
better access and fewer inequalities.
Additionally, at least some of the barriers people with disabilities experienced obtaining routine preventative care prior
to reform resulted from inaccessible equipment, such as scales,
321
X-ray equipment, and exam tables. Pursuant to the ACA, the
Access Board, a federal agency charged with facilitating access
for people with disabilities, will develop standards for medical
322
diagnostic equipment.
These provisions will help remove
some of the structural barriers that have impeded health-care
access for people with disabilities. Thus, they likewise serve
disability rights by promoting equality, access, and integration
in health-care delivery.
3. Public Health and the ACA
Health-care reform also institutes several changes to public health law that impact people with disabilities. Significantly, the ACA is among the first federal legislation to recognize
people with disabilities explicitly as a health disparities population. Historically, “health disparity” has not had a consistent
323
meaning. The National Institutes of Health Working Group
has defined the term as “differences in the incidence, prevalence, mortality, and burden of diseases and other adverse
health conditions that exist among specific population groups
324
in the United States.” Previously, health disparities research
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1059–65.
322. ACA § 4203.
323. Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1076 (noting that
“‘[h]ealth disparity’ is a fluid term meaning many things to different agencies”).
324. Id. at 1077 n.129 (quoting Press Release, Nat'l Inst. of Health, NIH
Announces Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities (Sept. 27,
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has focused almost exclusively on racial and ethnic minori325
ties.
Among the goals of health-care reform was reducing health
326
disparities across multiple populations. The ACA marks one
of the first occasions that Congress has recognized people with
disabilities as a population with its own specific health-care
327
needs. The legislation provides that—in addition to traditional health disparities populations—federally funded or supported health programs must collect and report data on disabil328
ity.
The ACA allocates funds for the “development,
evaluation, and dissemination of research, demonstration projects, and model curricula for cultural competency, prevention,
public health proficiency, reducing health disparities, and apti329
tude for working with individuals with disabilities.” Further,
the legislation requires the federal government and federally
funded entities to compile and report data on disability and
health-care delivery. The Department of Health and Human
Services must ensure that all federally supported health care or
public health programs collect data regarding where people
with disabilities access care, the availability of accessible facilities and medical equipment, which providers serve people with
disabilities, and the extent of their disability competency train-

2010)).
325. The Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education
Act of 2000 defines “minority group” as “racial and ethnic minority group.” 42
U.S.C. § 287c-31(c)(3) (2006); see also Pendo, Reducing Disparities, supra note
150, at 1077 n.130 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 287c-31).
326. See ACA § 3011 (establishing a national strategy and priorities that
includes improving health outcomes for all populations and “reducing health
disparities across health disparity populations”).
327. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217 (“This is one of the first times in federal legislation that health disparities for individuals with disabilities have
been acknowledged with other minority populations and will assist with advancing future efforts.”).
328. ACA § 4302. To be clear, the legislation does not explicitly designate
people with disabilities as a health disparities population. Instead, it lists
“disability status” alongside traditional health disparities groups. Id.; Pendo,
Reducing Disparities, supra note 150, at 1077 (“Although the section does not
specifically provide that individuals with disabilities will be recognized as a
health disparity population, this provision does include ‘disability status’
among previously recognized disparity populations and affords the same research benefits to this population.”).
329. ACA § 5307(a); see also USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 7–8 (explaining that the ACA provides grants and other incentives to create programs
and model curricula for “disability awareness training to help reduce the
health disparities that exist for people with disabilities”).
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ing. Disability rights advocates considered the inclusion of
individuals with disabilities in this research as a “significant
331
victory” for the disability community. The civil rights implications of designating disability as a health disparities population are two-fold. To begin, it has an expressive value. Including the disability community alongside other socially
recognized groups acknowledges that, like racial and ethnic
minorities, people with disabilities have experienced systematic
discrimination. More practically, compiling research will allow
health-care providers to better serve people with disabilities,
thereby reducing the disparities they currently experience.
C. INTEGRATED PROTECTIONS: LESSONS FROM THE ACA
The ACA thus constitutes a departure from the historical
schism in substantive legal protections for people with disabilities between the health law and civil rights law paradigms. Despite its health care purpose and substantive provisions,
health-care reform effectively functions as a piece of disability
rights legislation, by improving access to health care and facili332
tating equality and integration in its delivery. Moreover, giv330. ACA § 4302; see also Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217; USA & NSCIA,
supra note 256, at 8.
331. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217.
332. That is not to say the ACA is perfect with respect to its treatment of
people with disabilities. Substantial room for improvement still exists. In the
realm of private health insurance—even with the elimination of preexisting
condition exclusions, health status-based rating, and caps—people with disabilities may still experience disadvantage, even after the ACA takes full effect.
For example, employers can offer their employees reduced premiums for participating in wellness programs, initiatives designed to promote healthy living,
in the hopes of lowering health-insurance costs down the line. ACA § 1201 (describing wellness programs). These employer-sponsored wellness programs
could have an unintended adverse effect on certain individuals with disabilities. USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 8. Specifically, people with disabilities
may not be able to participate in qualifying exercise regiments or other
measures at the same rate as workers without disabilities. Id. (explaining that
“a person with a disability may be unable to participate in an exercise program or another benchmark of the wellness program”). Consequently, disabled
employees may not be eligible for the reduced premiums offered through the
wellness programs, putting them in a position of disadvantage relative to their
non-disabled colleagues. Id. Thus, advocates of disability rights have urged the
disability community to take an active role in developing the qualifying programs by providing guidance to the Department of Health and Human Services. Id.
Moreover, while the ACA as of 2014 eliminates health status-based rating
for certain insurers, the new factors could likewise negatively impact people
with disabilities. Geographic location, age, and tobacco use are all crude proxies for health. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1191. Thus, if health insurers dif-
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en the interrelatedness of health care and access to other kinds
333
of social goods such as employment, the civil rights effect of
the ACA extends beyond the health-care context, thus laying
the groundwork for the improved social standing of people with
disabilities in other areas.
With its use of health law to attack disparities and to promote access, the ACA represents a new approach to protecting
disability rights. Although on its face the ACA is health legislation, the impact of several of its provisions sound in the register
of civil rights. The statute can thus be understood as a health
law that also functions as a disability rights law. However, this
analysis does not end with health-care reform. The ACA provides a useful case study to demonstrate how integrating subject-specific legislation into the civil rights arsenal can further
the rights of people with disabilities, as well as other historically disadvantaged groups. Thus, health-care reform demonstrates that non-civil rights statutes can have civil rights effects, a useful insight in the context of people with disabilities
and health care, and beyond.
The nature of discrimination has changed since the first
334
generation of civil rights laws passed. Lawmakers initially
ferentiate on the basis of those factors, they will end up disadvantaging the
same individuals, albeit according to less accurate risk assessment criteria. Id.
at 1191–94. The ACA can, therefore, be understood to eliminate facial discrimination on the basis of health status, but still have a disparate impact. Id.
Additionally, as Elizabeth Pendo has pointed out, while the ACA makes
great strides in terms of ensuring the increased availability of accessible medical equipment, it leaves much to interpretation. Pendo, Reducing Disparities,
supra note 150, at 1080–83. The Access Board will create guidelines for manufacturers and providers to follow; however, the term “meaningful access” remains ambiguous. Id. at 1081. The current law is silent as to just how much
accessible equipment is enough. Id. This conundrum is no new problem for issues of access—similar issues have arisen in the context of Title II of the ADA.
Id.
Further, although the ACA recognizes people with disabilities as a health
disparities population, it does not designate them as “medically underserved.”
The “medically underserved” designation holds special significance because it
is connected with several federal programs designed to address health disparities and to facilitate access to health care. Caldwell, supra note 256, at 217.
While people with disabilities meet many of the criteria necessary to qualify as
medically underserved, including heightened levels of poverty and infant mortality, they have never been formally recognized as such. Id. Disability rights
advocates have, therefore, encouraged the disability community to take action
regarding their recognition. Id.
333. See supra notes 220–32 and accompanying text (discussing
Bagenstos’s scholarship on this point).
334. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (explaining that
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designed those protections to combat the intentional, categori335
cal exclusion and subordination of people of color and women.
Thus, the wrongful conduct envisioned by the statutes was outright and explicit differential treatment on the basis of group
336
status. Yet, even after the enactment of those laws, disparities persisted, leading scholars to speculate as to the cause of
the continuing inequality. Many concluded that implicit bias
and institutional structures combine to form a more subtle va337
riety of second-generation discrimination. Perhaps unsurprisingly, legislation designed to attack first-generation discrimination has done little to dismantle the infrastructures responsible
338
for second-generation discrimination.
The civil rights paradigm is, therefore, a product of an earlier era in which overt discrimination and outright exclusion
were the order of the day. While those protections remain necessary to the antidiscrimination project, acting alone, they are
no longer sufficient. A world dominated by second-generation
discrimination requires a more complex legal regime to address
persistent structural inequities through actively promoting the
the “[s]moking guns—the sign on the door that ‘Irish need not apply’ or the
rejection explained by the comment that ‘this is no job for a woman’—are
largely things of the past”). I borrow the “first generation” and “second generation” terminology from Susan Sturm’s seminal article on structural inequality.
335. Id. at 465–66 (“The first generation employment discrimination cases
mirror the social and political conditions that led to the adoption of the civil
rights legislation. Workplace segregation was maintained through overt exclusion, segregation of job opportunity, and conscious stereotyping. Dominant individuals and groups deliberately excluded or subordinated women and people
of color.”).
336. Id. at 466 (identifying the “wrong” of first generation discrimination
as “deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or gender”).
337. See, e.g., id. at 460 (explaining that “second generation manifestations
of workplace bias are structural, relational, and situational”); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–15 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, The Structural Turn]
(summarizing the literature on structural inequalities and attributing those
disparities to unconscious bias and workplace structure); see also Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995).
338. Several scholars have weighed in regarding how to address the problem of second-generation discrimination, including Bagenstos and Satz. See
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn, supra note 337 (arguing for a moderate approach to structural discrimination); Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination, supra note 5, at 550 (citing the universal vulnerability perspective as a means to address second-generation discrimination).
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rights of historically disadvantaged groups. The integrated legal approach, therefore, has two key components: (1) civil
rights legislation (including claims for disparate impact) to attack discrimination and exclusion; and (2) non-civil rights legislation to confer substantive benefits. Just as issues of healthcare availability and access necessitated a health law paradigm, disparities in different areas likewise require integrating
other legal frameworks into the civil rights project.
The ACA can be read as conferring a number of rights and
benefits on people with disabilities. Perhaps most clearly, the
changes to the public health insurance system, including Medicaid expansion and increased supports for at-home care, confer
tangible health-care benefits on qualifying individuals with
disabilities. Less obviously, the changes to private insurance
can also be read as creating certain entitlements. Pursuant to
the mandate (with few exceptions), people who are not insured
339
publically must acquire health insurance.
The legislation
contains provisions to facilitate access to private insurance
where there had not been access in the past, such as the temporary high-risk pools for people previously denied health insurance because of preexisting conditions, the low-income subsidy,
340
and the state exchanges. These policies and programs—read
alongside the ACA’s prohibitions on caps, preexisting condition
exclusions, and health status-based rating described above—
can be understood as allocating a right to access health insurance where one had not previously existed. Moreover, some
have even argued that the legislation may create a private
341
right of action for discrimination in private health insurance.
Finally, the changes to public health law also benefit people
with disabilities. The legislation allocates funds to address
342
health disparities for the enumerated populations. Thus, recognizing people with disabilities as a health disparities popula339. ACA § 1501, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 242 (2010) (amending the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), to require “applicable individual[s]” to obtain minimum essential coverage).
340. See ACA § 1311 (providing consumer choice through health exchanges); ACA § 1331 (providing flexibility to states to establish health programs for
low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid); Press Release,
HealthCare.gov, Temporary High Risk Pool Program (July 1, 2010), available
at
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2010/07/temp-high-risk-pool
-program.html.
341. See, e.g., Sarah G. Steege, Finding a Cure in the Courts: A Private
Right of Action for Disparate Impact in Health Care, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L.
439 (2011).
342. See supra notes 329–31 and accompanying text.
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tion brings with it federal monies. While not a direct, individual entitlement like Medicaid benefits, the allocation of funds
specifically to address the health disparities people with disabilities face represents a federal benefit designed to promote
the civil rights goals of equality, access, and integration in the
context of health care.
Taking a lesson from the ACA, this Article proposes an integrated approach, that is, using substantive, non-civil rights
protections in conjunction with antidiscrimination protections.
The ACA itself exemplifies the integrated legal approach to
disability rights by including its own civil rights-style protection. In addition to the beneficial provisions outlined above, the
ACA also includes a nondiscrimination section that indicates
federally funded health programs cannot discriminate on the
basis of disability and identifies the Rehabilitation Act as the
343
proper enforcement mechanism. It also authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations
344
implementing that section. Thus, the ACA recognizes the dual nature of the health disparities that face people with disabilities—the problem is both a matter of health-care access and a
345
matter of civil rights.
Importantly, advocates should not abandon the civil rights
paradigm: its statutes serve important expressive and practical
functions. On one level, civil rights laws frame the inequities
346
they target as social problems. On another, civil rights laws
347
provide a means to attack discriminatory conduct. Thus, proponents of disability rights should continue their support for
the civil rights paradigm, both to keep disability rights framed
as a social issue and to combat the more traditional forms of
discrimination, even as they grow increasingly rare.
The integrated approach is not specific to health law (or
even to disability). As the following example demonstrates, advocates have been combining civil rights laws and other types
of legislation for decades to allow comprehensive coverage.
343. USA & NSCIA, supra note 256, at 8.
344. Id.
345. Elizabeth Pendo has made a similar observation. See Pendo, Reducing
Disparities, supra note 150, at 1058 (“The reframing of barriers and disparities faced by people with disabilities as an issue of health care access and quality under the [ACA]—in addition to an issue of civil rights under the ADA—
appears promising.”).
346. See SWITZER, supra note 77, at 91 (describing the symbolic relevance
of civil rights law as a remedy).
347. Regrettably, overt discrimination has not disappeared.
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However, identifying this phenomenon as an effective strategy
for combating inequalities and promoting access and integration allows reformers to bring this strategy to the forefront of
their legislative agendas.
Education for minor children provides a useful example of
integrated legal protections for people with disabilities outside
health law. Congress originally passed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), formerly the Education for
348
All Handicapped Children Act, in 1975. The law provides
funding to states for “special education and related services” for
349
children with disabilities. Although schools are not required
350
to maximize a student with a disability’s potential, school
districts must provide a free and appropriate public educa351
tion. The Rehabilitation Act and either Title II or III of the
352
ADA also apply in educational settings. The special education
legislation and the civil rights legislation serve different, yet related purposes.
Because IDEA allows parents of children with disabilities
to challenge “any matter” related to a child’s ability to obtain a
353
free and appropriate education, courts have held that claims
against a school district that are “educational in nature” are
“presumptively redressable” through IDEA’s administrative
354
process, and therefore subject to its exhaustion requirement.
However, when parents Bob and Karen Ellenberg sued on behalf of their daughter S.E. under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and the ADA, the Tenth Circuit held that their failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available under IDEA did
355
not bar their other claims. The court justified its decision to
treat the civil rights claims separately because the Ellenbergs
were “unable to obtain relief under the IDEA for their pure discrimination claims brought pursuant to the [Rehabilitation
348. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
349. Id. § 1411(a)(1).
350. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
351. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006).
352. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination in federally supported
or conducted programs. 29 U.S.C. ch. 16 (2006). Title II of the ADA prohibits
discrimination by public entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006). Title III of
the ADA applies to public accommodations. Id. §§ 12181–12189. Depending
how they are funded schools may be covered by a combination of these provisions.
353. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A).
354. See Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1275
(10th Cir. 2000).
355. Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Act] and ADA.” Although IDEA mandates a free and appropriate education and the provision of special education and related services, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act provide concurrent yet complementary protection by prohibiting schools
from engaging in discriminatory practices. Thus, both kinds of
laws, working together, are essential to a meaningful education
for children with disabilities.
In a world of second-generation discrimination, traditional
civil rights legislation, acting alone, may not achieve the desired levels of equality, access, and integration for historically
disadvantaged groups. Thus, advocates should look outside the
confines of the traditional civil rights model and support subject-specific legislation that confers tangible rights and benefits. While this Article focuses on people with disabilities, the
integrated approach could likewise aid other populations who
face structural inequality.
Given the positive impact it could have for people with disabilities, the ACA demonstrates that a statute within the
“health law” paradigm may also function as a “civil rights law.”
Health law and traditional civil rights law can work together to
promote access and to reduce disparities. The use of non-civil
rights legislation, in addition to existing antidiscrimination
protections, represents an integrated approach to advancing
the interests of historically disadvantaged groups. People with
disabilities and health-care reform are but one example. This
legislative strategy, which combines prohibitions on discrimination and exclusion with benefits designed to facilitate access
and integration, may have currency in other areas of the law
and for advocates of other subordinated populations.
CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act was a watershed moment for disability rights. Advocates of the disability community launched
expansive campaigns and forged powerful alliances to ensure
that the resulting legislation would address the significant
health disparities they faced. However, this strategy represents
a significant departure from the early part of the disability
rights movement, when champions of disability rights actively
shunned health law protections.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act constitute valuable
symbolic victories by recognizing disability as an antidiscrimi356. Id. (emphasis added).
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nation category. However, those laws had a limited impact in
achieving equality, access, and integration for the disability
community, particularly in the area of health care. Although
those statutes apply to health-care providers, people with disabilities continued to experience notable health disparities, due
in no small part to the structural barriers they have historically encountered securing adequate insurance and obtaining
needed services and devices. The civil rights paradigm was not
the proper instrument to address the issues underlying those
inequities. As a result, disability rights advocates rallied
around Congress’s effort to reform health care. The legislation
thus contains many provisions that will benefit people with
disabilities.
The Affordable Care Act represents a sea change for proponents of disability rights. It demonstrates that health law
can function as civil rights law. It also exemplifies a particular
approach to achieving antidiscrimination goals. The Affordable
Care Act works with existing civil rights statutes to provide a
comprehensive web of legal protections that both outlaw discrimination and promote access. By integrating other kinds of
substantive protections into their civil rights agenda, advocates
can address the subtle, second-generation discrimination that
perpetuates existing inequalities. Moreover, the integrated legal approach could have broad implications for civil rights proponents generally, not just for disability rights. While glimmers
of this strategy already exist within the antidiscrimination project, fully embracing it as a legislative agenda and a tool for
change might garner substantial benefits for historically disadvantaged groups. The Affordable Care Act will have lasting
benefits for people with disabilities, both in terms of its substantive protections and as a model for future reform, in health
care and beyond.

